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I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars and practitioners agree that the path to a successful medical
malpractice recovery is a thorny and treacherous one. One commentator
characterizes the presuit requirements of Florida's Medical Malpractice
Reform Act' ("the Act") in Shakespearian parlance, as a "labyrinth" where
"[m]inotaurs and ugly treasons lurk."2 Another warns of the "pitfalls"
involved in bringing a claim for medical malpractice. 3 Still another
scathingly opines that the Act robs innocent victims of redress, while the4
perpetrators (i.e., the medical profession) are "getting away with 'murder."'
However, from this writer's viewpoint, if a homicide has occurred, it has
been in the metaphorical sense and probably amounts only to involuntary
manslaughter, with the Florida Legislature and courts being the perpetrators
and the state of the law of medical malpractice personifying the victim.
Since its inception in 1975, there have been numerous revisions and
amendments to the Act and a steady and copious stream of judicial decisions
interpreting it. Yet, the legislature and the judiciary have- failed to articulate
a clear line of demarcation between tort claims that fall within the Act's
coverage and those falling outside, or to differentiate adequately, between
claims subject to the medical malpractice statute of limitations and those
which are not. The result is that presently, plaintiffs' attorneys must proceed
at their peril (and obviously that of their clients) in a quagmire of ill-defined
terms and internal inconsistencies. Unfortunately, clairvoyant powers may
be needed to predict how a court will rule on presuit and/or statute of
limitations issues in a given case.
The focus of this article will be upon two questions: first, under what
circumstances do the presuit requirements5 apply to a tort claim? Secondly,
when does the medical malpractice statute of limitations 6 apply? It will
I.
See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 766.101-.316 (1997).
2.
John A. Grant, Florida'sPresuitRequirementsfor Medical MalpracticeActions, 68
FLA. B.J. 12, 12 (Feb. 1994). The complete quotation, which Mr. Grant sets forth under the title to
his article, is as follows: "Thou mayst not wander in the labyrinth; There Minotaurs and ugly
treasons lurk." Ila(quoting WmLLm SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRsT PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH
act 5,sc. 3).
3.
Jeffery L. Blostein, Judicial Interpretationsof Presuit in Florida: How to Avoid the
Pitfallsof Bringing or Defending a Claimfor MedicalMalpractice,71 FLA. B.J. 45,45 (1997).
4.
Jessica Fonseca-Nader, Florida'sComprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act:

Is it Timefor a Change, 8 ST. THIOMAS L. REV. 551,569 (1995).
5.
FLA. STAT. §§ 766.106; .203-.206 (1997). See discussion infra Part II.A for an
overview of the Act's presuit requirements.
6.
FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997). The statute reads as follows:
An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from
the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from
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become apparent to the reader that these two questions are intimately related
and to an important extent, inextricably intertwined. Yet, inexplicably, the
Florida courts have used conflicting criteria in the resolution of each of these
two issues. Moreover, critical terms of art have been defined differently by
the Florida Legislature and by the courts, depending on whether it is a
coverage issue or a statute of limitations issue being addressed.
Following the introduction, Part II of this article will discuss the
definition of a claim for medical malpractice under the Act and how the
courts have construed and applied this definition, specifically in the context
of whether a claim arising out of an injury sustained in a medical setting is
subject to the presuit provisions of the Act. Part I will discuss how the
courts have resolved whether a claim is subject to the two-year medical
malpractice statute of limitations 7 or the four-year statute of limitations
governing claims for ordinary negligence. Also, both Parts II and III, will
analyze why the current statutory and case law is anomalous, inconsistent,
and likely to be confusing to the practitioner. Part IV will conclude with a
discussion of how the vagaries and inconsistencies relating to coverage and
statute of limitations issues can be eliminated and how,. until such reform
takes place, prudent attorneys may want to proceed.
II. DETERMINING WHEN THE PRESUIT REQUIREMENTS OF THE Acr APPLY
The focus of this part will be upon how the Florida courts have gone
about determining whether a given claim is subject to, inter alia, the presuit
notice, investigation, and screening requirements of the Act ("Presuit
Requirements").

A.

An Overview of the Act's PresuitRequirements

The Act defines a "claim for medical malpractice" as "a claim arising
out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services."
Prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, the claimant must satisfy
the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the
exercise of due diligence.... An "action for medical malpractice" is defined
as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or
monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical
diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care. The limitation of
actions within this subsection shall be limited to the health care provider and
persons in privity with the provider of health care.

Id.
7.
8.

Id.
Id. § 95.11(3)(a).

9.

Id. § 766.106(l)(a).
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certain presuit requirements. First, the claimant must conduct and complete a
"presuit investigation" of the claim pursuant to section 766.203 of the
Florida Statutes.'0 Upon application to the court by the claimant, an
automatic ninety-day extension of statute of limitations will be granted to
facilitate this presuit investigation." The purpose of the presuit investigation
is to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any party
ultimately named as a defendant in the lawsuit was negligent in the care and
treatment of the claimant, and that such negligence resulted in injury to the
claimant.' 2 Under section 766.203(2), corroboration of reasonable grounds
to initiate litigation for medical malpractice "shall be provided by the
claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a
medical expert as defined in section 766.202(5)... which statement shall
corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical
negligence.' 3 After completion of the presuit investigation pursuant to
section 766.203 and before filing a claim for medical malpractice, the
claimant must notify each prospective defendant of an intent to initiate
litigation for medical malpractice.' 4 The notice must contain the "date and a
summary of the occurrence giving rise to the claim and a description of the
injury to the claimant."' 15 No suit may then be filed for a period of ninety
days after the notice is mailed to any prospective defendant and during this
ninety-day period the prospective defendant's insurer must conduct a review
to determine liability of the defendant. 16 During the ninety-day period,
which the Act denominates as the "presuit screening period,' ' 17 the parties
conduct an informal, but mandatory discovery process 8 during which each
prospective defendant's insurer or self-insurer must undertake an
investigation and review of the claim in good faith, and both the claimant and
prospective defendant must cooperate with the insurer in good faith.' 9
Failure of a party to comply with the presuit notice requirement of section
766.103, the reasonable investigation requirements of sections 766.201-.212,
constitutes
or the informal discovery requirements of section 766.106(6)-(9),
2
0
grounds for dismissal by the court of the claims or defenses.
10. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2) (1997).
11. Id. § 766.104(2).
12. Id. § 766.203(2)(a), (b).
13. Id. § 766.203(2).
14. Id. § 766.106(2) (1997).
15. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2) (1997).
16. Id. § 766.106(3)(a).
17. Id. § 766.106.
18. Id. § 766.106(6)-(9).
19. Id. § 766.106(3)(a).
20. FLA. STAT. §§ 766.106(3)(a), (6); .206(2). See also Community Blood Ctrs., Inc. v.
Damiano, 697 So. 2d 948, 952 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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Under the Act, the notice of intent to initiate litigation must be served
within the time limits set forth in section 95.11(4)(b) of the Florida
Statutes.2 ' The notice of intent to initiate litigation must be accompanied by
the corroborating opinion. 22 "[T]he notice of intent to initiate litigation and
the corroborating medical expert opinion, taken together, must sufficiently
indicate the manner in which the defendant doctor allegedly deviated from
the standard of care, and must provide adequate information for the
defendants to evaluate the merits of the claim." 23 During the ninety-day
period following receipt of the notice by the prospective defendants, "the
statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants." 24 The parties
are free to stipulate to an extension of the ninety-day presuit screening period
and the statute of limitations will be further tolled during any such
extension.2 5 Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an
extended period or even where there has been no extension, but there has
been a rejection of the claim, "the claimant shall have 60 [sixty] days or the
remainder of the period 26of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater,
within which to file suit.
The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive discussion of presuit
requirements; an in-depth analysis of this issue would be beyond the scope of
this article.27 However, the above capsulation has been set forth for context,
so that the reader may be mindful of the importance of determining early on
whether the claimant and the prospective defendants must comply with
presuit requirements. Since noncompliance with these requirements can
result in sanctions as drastic as dismissal,28 obviously the prudent attorney
will want to be correct in assessing whether the contemplated action is
subject to presuit requirements and/or to the two-year limitations period
prescribed by section 95.11(4)(b).

21.
22.
23.

FLA. STAT. §95.11(4)(b) (1997). See supra text accompanying note 6.
See FLA. STAT. § 766.203 (2).

24.
25.
26.

See FLA. STAT. § 766.106(4).
Id
Id See also Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177, 182 (Fla. 1993).

27.

There are several recent well researched articles discussing presuit issues

Duffy v. Brooker, 614 So. 2d 539,545 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

comprehensively. See Jeffery L. Blostein, JudicialInterpretationsof Presuitin Florida: How to
Avoid the Pitfalls of Bringing or Defending a Claimfor Medical Malpractice,71 FLA. B.J. 45
(1997); John A. Grant, Florida'sPresuitRequirementsfor Medical MalpracticeActions, 68 FLA.
B.J. 12 (1994).
28. See FLA. STAT. §§ 766.106(3)(a), .106(6), .106(4).
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Survey and Legal Analysis of Statutory and Case Law

As noted above, among the most crucial requirements of the Act are the
requirements of presuit notice, investigation, and screening.
Section
766.106(2) of the Act provides in pertinent part: "[a]fter completion of
presuit investigation•., and prior to filing a claimfor medical malpractice, a
claimant shall notify each prospective defendant.., of intent to initiate
litigation. 29 The above quoted section of 766.106(2) gives rise to two
crucial questions. First, what constitutes "a claim for medical malpractice?"
Second, what is the meaning of the term "prospective defendant?" For if a
claim is "a claim for medical malpractice" and it is against one to whom the
legislature was referring when it used the term "prospective defendant," then
the plaintiff must conduct a presuit investigation, procure a corroborating
opinion, and give notice to the defendant(s) of intent to initiate litigation for
malpractice.
C.

What Constitutes a "Claimfor Medical Malpractice"for Purposes of
Presuit?

This first question is only partially answered by the language of section
766.106(1)(a).
Section 766.106(1)(a) defines a "claim for medical
malpractice" as "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to
render, medical care or services." Still, there is the further question of what
constitutes the "rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or
services" for purposes of section 766.106?
In NME Properties,Inc. v. McCullouh,32 the Second District Court of
Appeal attempted to answer this question. The court held that because the
complaint did not allege that employees or agents of the defendant nursing
home rendered medical care or service 34 to the plaintiff, the claim was not a
claim for medical malpractice.35 At the outset, the court noted that presuit
requirements apply only to "claim[s] for medical malpractice" as defined by
section 766.106(l)(a) of the FloridaStatutes. 6 The court went on to assert
that the "simplest test" for determining whether a particular claim is one for
29.
30.
(1997)).
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. § 766.106(2) (emphasis added).
Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993) (citing FLA. STAT.

§ 766.106(2)

FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a).
590 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 441.
See FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a).
McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 441.
Id.
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medical malpractice subject to presuit requirements is "whether the
professional medical negligence standard of care described 37in section
766.102, Florida Statutes (1989), applies to the active tortfeasor."
However, upon thoughtful analysis, this "test" is not a "simple" test at
all, but is complicated and circular. Section 766.102(1) provides in pertinent
part that "[t]he prevailing professional standard of care... shall be that level
of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding
circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably
prudent similar health care providers." ' 8 Although it articulates the standard
of care that is applicable when a claim arises out of the rendering of, or
failure to render, medical care or services, section 766.102(!) does not
resolve the threshold question of what constitutes "the rendering of, or failure
to render medical, care or services." 39 Thus, it does not really answer the
question of what constitutes a claim for medical malpractice subject to
presuit requirements. Logic would dictate that only after one has first
determined that a particular claim is one for medical malpractice, (i.e., one
arising out of the rendering of, or failure to render, medical care or services)
should section 766.102(1) then come into play to guide the resolution of
whether the particular medical care or services rendered fell below the
applicable standard of care and thus, constituted a breach of duty. In this
commentator's view, the McCullough court put the proverbial cart before the
horse. The court suggested that one can discern whether a claim is one for
medical malpractice subject to presuit requirements by determining in the
first instance whether the professional standard of care set forth in section
766.102(1) "applies to the active tortfeasor."'' However, the reverse actually
makes more sense; that is, there must first be a threshold determination as to
whether the claim is "a claim for medical malpractice," to wit, a claim arising
out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.
This determination having been made, only then should section 766.102(1)
be applied to determine whether the medical care or services rendered
comported with or fell below the applicable standard of medical care recited
in that section.4' A much simpler and more workable test would be to
37.

Id.

38.

FLA. STAT.

39.
40.

See id.
McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 441.

§ 766.102(1) (1997).

41. See also Broadway v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 638 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
In Broadway, the first district noted that "[tihe test for determining whether a defendant is entitled
to the benefit of the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes, is whether
the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set
forth in section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes." Id. at 177. Again, framing the test in such terms is
circular and begs the question. We must first know whether the claim is one which arises out of
"the rendering, of or failure to render, medical care or services" and thus, whether it is "a claim for
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examine whether the alleged incidents giving rise to the claim involved the
professional skill or judgment of the defendant. The McCullough court
hinted strongly that if the plaintiff had alleged facts indicating negligence in
the exercise of medical skill or judgment, then the action would have been
deemed a claim for malpractice. 42 Implicitly, the court equated claims
arising out of the exercise of professional skill and judgment with claims
arising out of the rendering of, or failure to render, medical services or care,
when it noted that the plaintiff failed to allege that the incident involved the
defendant's professional skill or judgment.4 3
In any event, we are still left with the question of how to determine
whether a claim is one for medical malpractice for purposes of presuit. To
phrase it another way, how can an attorney figure out, with any degree of
certainty, when his client's claim "arise[s] out of the rendering of, or failure
to render, medical care or services?" 44 An exploration of some recent case
law may help to provide the answer.
In J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hospital,45 the Supreme Court of Florida
addressed the question of when an action constitutes a claim for medical
malpractice for purposes of whether presuit notice is required under section
766.106(2).46 As the court in McCullough had done, the supreme court
examined the definition of "a claim for medical malpractice" set forth under
section 766.106(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes.47 However, the J.B. court
concluded that because the plaintiff's claim did not arise out of the rendering
of, or failure to render, medical care or services, presuit notice and screening
requirements did not apply.48 The gravamen of the plaintiff's claim was that
the defendant hospital had asked the plaintiff to transport his brother, a
patient at the hospital, to another hospital without telling the plaintiff that his
brother had AIDS and without warning him that he could become HIV
positive if he came into contact with his brother's wounds.4 9 The court
observed that:
According to the allegations in J.B.'s complaint, the Hospital was
negligent in using J.B. as a transporter. The complaint does not
medical malpractice." FLA. STAT. § 766.106(l)(A) (1997). Only then can we determine whether a
defendant was negligent in the rendering of those medical services by applying the section
766.102(1) professional standard of care to the conduct of the defendant.
42. McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 441.
43. Id.
44. See FLA. STAT. § 766.106(l)(a).
45. 635 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1994).
46. Id. at 947.
47. Id. at 948-49; see also McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 441.
48. J.B., 635 So. 2d at 949.
49. Id. at946-47.
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allege that the Hospital was negligent in any way in the rendering
of, or the failure to render, medical care or services to J.B.
Accordingly, the complaint does not state a medical malpractice
claim for chapter 766 purposes, and50 the notice and presuit
screening requirements are inapplicable.
The court's reasoning in J.B. does help to elucidate the meaning of the
term "rendering of, or failure to render, medical care or services" and serves
to illustrate that not every claim which arises in a medical setting is one for
medical malpractice. J.B. was not a patient, and he apparently had no
injuries, disease, or other condition; he did not in any way either seek or
receive professional care or services from the hospital.5' Arguably, the
failure of the hospital to warn J.B. that there was a risk of AIDS transmission
if he came into contact with his brother's wounds was a very serious lapse in
medical judgment. However, what appears to have been key to the court's
decision was the fact that the hospital's negligence did not occur in the
course of rendering medical services to the plaintiff, that is, to J.B .52
Conversely, if J.B. had been a patient of the hospital and he contracted AIDS
through, say, an improperly sterilized instrument or needle, then his claim
would undoubtedly have been one for malpractice. In such a case, the claim
would clearly have arisen out of the rendering of medical services to J.B.
Another case dealing with the distinction between claims subject to
presuit requirements and those which are not, is the recent decision of Feifer
v. Galen of Florida,Inc.5 3 In Feifer, the plaintiff, an elderly man, presented
himself at the defendant hospital after being directed to do so by his
physician. The plaintiffs hands were obviously shaking, he walked with
slow shuffling steps with his hand on his hip, and he openly complained to
the hospital about his weakness. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
hospital's admission employees told him that he would have to walk under
his own power to the various areas of the building, down long corridors with
hard floors, no handrails, no benches or chairs for sitting or resting, and with
neither a wheelchair nor escort having been provided.56 The plaintiff further
alleged that the conditions of the corridor, as described above, constituted an
"unsafe passageway" and a "dangerously negligent condition" of which the
hospital knew or should have knownY Allegedly, the plaintiff then suddenly
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 949 (emphasis added).
Id. at948.
Id. at 949.
685 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 883.
Id

Id.
Id at 883-84.
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fell to the floor after walking to various areas of the hospital, resulting in a
broken hip and other permanent and painful bodily injuries which required
emergency surgery. 58 The hospital moved for a dismissal of Feifer's
complaint for negligence on the ground that he had failed to comply with the
presuit notice and screening requirements of chapter 766. 59 The trial court
granted the motion, but the Second District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that the plaintiff had effectively alleged a cause of action for
premises liability based on the breach of the hospital's duty to exercise
reasonable care in the maintenance of its premises. The court pointed out
that this was not a case of the hospital's negligence in the rendering of
"medical care" as contemplated by the Act. 6 1 Therefore, the court reasoned it
was not a claim for medical malpractice. 62 Rather, it was negligence in the
broader sense, a breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care in the
maintenance of property, a duty
which is incumbent upon any prudent person
• 63
premises.
occupies
or
owns
who
The Feifer court appears to have made somewhat of a subtle distinction
in arriving at its holding. Mr. Feifer's injury occurred while he was at the
hospital seeking medical care and services; he was clearly in a medical
setting when he fell in the hospital corridor and when the injury from the fall
occurred. 64 However, the injury allegedly occurred from the way in which
the hospital maintained the property-or more precisely-failed to maintain
it.65 The court characterized the negligence as being outside
the sphere of the
66
rendering of, or failure to render, medical care or services.
However, upon closer analysis, the reasoning of Feifer is somewhat
questionable.
Arguably, because of its specialized knowledge and
58. Feifer,685 So. 2d. at 884.
59. Id. at 883.
60. Id.
61. Id. at885.
62. Id.
63. Feifer, 685 So. 2d at 884. See also Hicks v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 676 So. 2d 1019,
1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that action against hospital to recover for injuries
sustained by claimant when another patient, who was allegedly inebriated but allowed to keep a
cigarette lighter, set fire to his bed, was a claim for premises liability and not subject to presuit
requirements); Palm Springs Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Perez, 661 So. 2d 1222, 1223 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that action wherein patient sued hospital for negligently placing her in room
with second patient who committed homosexual attack on patient was an action for ordinary
negligence/premises liability rather than medical malpractice and therefore was not subject to
presuit screening requirements); Broadway v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 638 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a suit based upon the collapse of claimant's hospital bed was not a
claim for medical malpractice and hence not subject to presuit requirements).
64. Feifer,685 So. 2d at 883-84.
65. Id. at 884.
66. Id. at 885.
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experience, a hospital, unlike other property owners, is uniquely situated to
foresee the dangers which could befall elderly people like Mr. Feifer. Its
staff has the expertise to recognize that a patient's age or condition might
render a particular patient susceptible to dangers which might not necessarily
be foreseen by a layman property owner. The moment Mr. Feifer walked
through the door, he entrusted himself to the hospital's care. The hospital
staff directed Mr. Feifer to walk down the long corridors and provided no
escort, wheelchair, handrails, or benches for resting despite his obvious
frailty. In light of what it knew or should have known of the vulnerabilities
of an elderly person like Mr. Feifer, who exhibited cognizable symptoms of
physical illness and who complained of weakness, Galen Hospital arguably
committed medical negligence. Arguably, at the heart of the hospital's
omissions was a lapse of professional skill and judgment. 67 However, if the
Feifer court was at all torn between ordinary negligence and medical
malpractice, it should not be surprising that the court resolved the issue in
favor of Mr. Feifer in finding ordinary negligence. 68 The Feifer court quoted
the statement of policy articulated by the Supreme Court of Florida in J.B. v.
SacredHeart Hospital that "[i]f there is doubt as to the applicability of such
69
a statute, the question is generally resolved in favor of the claimant."
Although the supreme court in J.B. was referring specifically to section
95.11(4)(b), the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations, and the
Feifer court was referring to the Act's presuit requirements, the unifying
theme is that in the arena of medical malpractice, the courts have consistently

67. The distinction between medical care and ordinary or reasonable care can be
somewhat amorphous and elusive. The gist of Mr. Feifer's position that his claim was for
ordinary as opposed to medical negligence is captured in the following excerpt from his
memorandum in opposition to the hospital's motion to dismiss in the trial court:
[D]efendant's... argue that, because the word "care!' was used in the text of
the Complaint, and because the defendant corporate entity is generally
considered a health care provider, that plaintiffs' [sic] cannot pursue their
claim herein under an ordinary negligence cause of action but, rather, must
pursue it as a medical malpractice action with all the attendant statutory
conditions precedent to the filing of such a cause of action; defendant's
argument is a misconstruance of the word "care" into the context of "medical
care," a construction more favorable to the defendant, when the plain
meaning of the word "care" in the context used was such reasonable care as
any ordinary prudent person may be required by law to take to avoid injury to
others, in the classic definition of the tort of negligence.
Id. at 884 (quoting Response Brief for Appellant).

68.
69.

Id. at 885.
Id. (quoting J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 635 So. 2d 945,947 (Fla. 1994)).
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construed
statutes restricting access to the courts in a manner which favors
70
access.

In light of Feifer, it would seem that claims arising out of a hospital's
negligence when a patient is awaiting or enroute to or from receiving medical
services must be distinguished from injuries which occur from the
administering of the care or services themselves. Only claims based on the
71
latter are subject to presuit requirements under the reasoning of Feifer.
However, Feifer is not definitive because one can imagine situations where
the line between the rendering of medical care or services and negligent
maintenance of property could be quite blurry. It would be much harder to
criticize the Feifer court's reasoning if, for example, Mr. Feifer had slipped
on a patch of soapy water. Such a scenario would be more of a garden
variety type of negligence, a failure of reasonable care in the maintenance of
property; the consequence of which could befall anyone, of any age, in any
type of building which has a hallway or corridor.72 However, because of the
hospital's specialized knowledge of the frailties of the sick, elderly, and
infirm, what actually happened in Feifer could have justifiably been
considered a lapse of professional judgment which occurred in the course of
rendering medical service to a patient.
To illustrate this point, assume that a patient goes to a chiropractor for
treatment of a bad back. An interesting quandary would be presented if, for
example, while the chiropractor was treating the patient, the treatment table
collapsed. From the standpoint of time, the resultant injury occurred
"during" the rendering of medical services, but the question is, did it arise out
of the rendering of services from a conceptual standpoint? On one hand, one
could argue that the injury did not arise out of the rendering of medical
70. See Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1996); Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
1994); Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993); Community Blood Ctrs., Inc. v. Damiano,
697 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Melanson v. Agravat, 675 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1996). See also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 which provides: "The courts shall be open
to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay." Id.
71. See Feifer,685 So. 2d at 885.
72. But see Neilinger v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 460 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
In Neilinger, the plaintiff, a maternity patient, alleged that she slipped and fell on a pool of
amniotic fluid while descending from an examination table under the direction and care of hospital
employees. Id. at 566. The Neilingercourt held that the complaint, on its face, alleged breach of a
professional duty and that the action was therefore one for medical malpractice as opposed to
ordinary negligence. Id. One might argue that Neilinger is distinguishable from Feifer in that in
Neilinger the plaintiff slipped and fell while descending from the table at the direction and
supervisionof hospitalemployees. Id However, if the negligent assistance of hospital employees
in Neilinger was classified as medical negligence, it would seem that the allegation of a total lack
of assistance by hospital employees alleged by a frail and elderly Mr. Feifer could support a
finding of medical negligence in that case.
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services because it was a defect in the physical object upon which the patient
was being treated, rather than a defect in the treatment or care itself. On the
other hand, it can be argued that the table is a tool, in effect an "instrument"
of the chiropractor, and therefore in utilizing a substandard "instrument"
and/or in failing to maintain it in a safe condition, the chiropractor was
negligent in the rendering of medical services. In view of the policy favoring
access to the courts,73 most courts would probably find the patient's claim to
be for premises liability as opposed to medical malpractice, if such a finding
would result in dismissal of the claim.
To further illustrate the possibilities, let us consider an example of two
patients, both of whom are in the hospital. Patient A is injured as a result of
a nurse's failure to raise and secure the bed rails, while patient B is injured
due to the patient's bed collapsing. There is a respectable argument that
patient A's claim against the nurse and/or the hospital74 is a claim for
medical malpractice. We can safely assume that it is part of a nurse's
professional duties to see that the bed rails are raised for the protection of the
patient-if not the nurse, who else? In the author's view, a claim based on
the nurse's neglect to raise and secure the bed rails and the resultant injury to
the patient arises out of the rendering of or failure to render medical care or
services. It is a claim calling into account the exercise of her professional
skill and judgment." Undoubtedly, nurses are trained in many facets of
bedside care of patients. A nurse must know how to put in and take out
intravenous needles, wash and assist patients in excretory functions, help
them in and out of bed, and even know how to make a bed with a patient still
in it. Their training most likely includes the raising and securing of bed rails.
We can rest assured that the risk management division of the hospital will
insist upon such prophylactic measures. Indeed, the Florida courts have
recognized that one of the primary professional duties of a nurse is the
supervision of patients. 76 The raising of bed rails is arguably a component of
73. See, e.g., Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 838.
74. Even though a hospital may not itself be directly liable, a hospital can be held
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its agents or employees. See Pinillos v. Cedars of
Lebanon Hosp. Corp., 403 So. 2d 365, 368-69 (Fla. 1981); Reed v. Good Samaritan Hosp. Ass'n,
Inc., 453 So. 2d 229, 230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984). It should be noted that a hospital may
also be found vicariously liable on an apparent agency theory. See Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v.
Robbins, 433 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1983). In Orlando Executive Park,the Supreme Court of Florida
approved the requisites necessary to establish apparent agency: "'(1) a representation by the
principal; (2) reliance on that representation by a third person; and (3) a change of position by the
third person in reliance upon such representation to his detriment."' Id. at 494 (quoting Orlando
Executive Park, Inc. v. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d 442, 449 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
75. NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So. 2d 439, 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App.

1991).
76.

See Evenson v. Miami Med. Ctr., Inc., 128 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1961).
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a nurse's supervisory duties, which duties are, in turn, a constituent of the
care rendered by a nurse. Thus, the practitioner should be cautioned that
presuit requirements could apply in such a situation.
However, patient B's claim, if any, falls into more of a gray area. On
one hand, the hospital could be said to have been negligent in the rendering
of "medical" care or services because the provision of a bed to patients
would seem to be an integral part of the services rendered by the hospital.
Nevertheless, on the other hand, we must ask, does the provision of a bed by
a hospital equate to the rendering of "medical" care or services? The
maintenance of a bed in good mechanical working order is not something
that involves medical skill or judgment. So even though in the broad sense,
patient B's injuries occurred in the course of the hospital's rendering of
medical care and services, it is doubtful B's claim would be construed by a
court to be one for medical malpractice. In fact, in Broadway v. Bay
Hospital, Inc.,78 the court held that a plaintiffs claim for injuries she
sustained when her hospital bed collapsed was a claim for ordinary
negligence.79 The court noted that the plaintiff's allegations that the hospital
had failed to properly maintain a piece of equipment, or to warn of a
dangerous condition made the claim one for
negligent maintenance of the
80
premises as opposed to medical malpractice.
Another thought-provoking example might be that of two patients who
are injured by virtue of food they are served while in the hospital. Patient A
contracts salmonella as a result of ingesting undercooked chicken contaminated with the salmonella virus while patient B, whom the hospital knows to
be a diabetic, develops complications as a result of being served a diet too
high in sugars. What distinguishes A's claim from B's is the fact that the
breach of duty to patient A does not involve a lack of medical expertise. In
the same vein as the hospital's food service staff, a chef in a restaurant, or
even a social host, could be deemed negligent for causing salmonella by
undercooking chicken as it is common knowledge. However, as regards to
patient B, because of its specialized medical knowledge and expertise, the
hospital is or should be uniquely able to foresee the serious medical repercussions which could befall a patient with a disease requiring a special diet.
Thus, in the case of patient B, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the
hospital was negligent in the rendering of or failure to render "medical" care.
77. As we shall see and discuss in the next section of this article, the fact that a claim
arises out of the rendering of or the failure to render medical care or services and is therefore a
claim for medical malpractice, does not mean in and of itself, that presuit requirements apply; for
the prospective defendant must also be a "health care provider." See Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.
2d 835 (Fla. 1993).
78. 638 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
79. Id. at 177.

80.

Id.
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Consider one final example, that of a doctor, who, out of affection for a
patient, brings a vase of flowers to her bedside, but injures her when he
carelessly drops the vase upon her. Contrast that scenario to the doctor
poking that same patient in the eye with a sharp medical instrument in the
course of examining or treating her. While the former mishap exemplifies a
lack of ordinary care for which any layperson could be culpable, the latter
clearly involves neglect or a failure of skill in the rendering of a medical
service.
Although the determination of when an action will be deemed a claim
for medical malpractice for purposes of presuit is an inexact science, a
review of several other Florida cases should help the practitioner to
determine where the courts are likely to draw the line between actions which
constitute claims for medical malpractice and those which do not.
One such case is that of Palm Springs General Hospital, Inc. v. Perez.
In Perez, the Third District Court of Appeal upheld the denial of a hospital's
motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff had no obligation to comply with
presuit screening provisions where the hospital was allegedly negligent in
placing the plaintiff in a room with another patient who attacked her."2 The
Perez decision was well-reasoned in that it was not a medical risk to which
the patient was exposed, but rather the risk that another might harm her
because of known criminal propensities.83
In Jackson v. Biscayne Medical Center,Inc.,84 the plaintiff was a patient
who had allegedly been wrongfully removed from the defendant hospital
The plaintiff alleged that he was then
without medical authorization.
assaulted, battered, falsely arrested, slandered, and ultimately maliciously
prosecuted for trespassing at the hospital.8 6 The Third District Court of
Appeal reversed a dismissal of these claims notwithstanding that they arose
from the same transaction as other counts which were based upon
malpractice and which were properly dismissed for failure to comply with
presuit requirements.87 Although the Jackson decision appears to be sound,
81. 661 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct App. 1995).
82. Id. at 1223.
83. See also Hicks v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 676 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
In Hicks, an inebriated patient at the hospital set a fire resulting in another patient's death. Id. The
court concluded that the claim did not sound in medical malpractice but rather premises liability
and therefore the claim was not subject to the presuit requirements of the Act. Id. at 1019. Other
recent decisions have held that certain claims against hospitals or other medical care facilities can
be grounded in premises liability as opposed to medical malpractice. See, e.g., Robinson v. West
Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 675 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
84. 347 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).

85. Id. at722.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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it is still somewhat questionable in that what precipitated the assault, battery,
false imprisonment, etc. was the wrongful discharge from the hospital
without medical authorization." If a patient is discharged from the hospital
before it is medically sound to do so, then arguably there has been a breach
of duty arising out of the rendering of, or more precisely, the failure to render
medical care or services. However, the intentionally tortious behavior, which
occurred following that wrongful discharge, is distinguishable from the
medical repercussions one might ordinarily expect, such as a relapse or
worsening of the underlying medical condition. In that the tortious conduct
in question was quite attenuated and remote from the expected consequence
of a wrongful discharge of a patient, the Jackson decision is justifiable. If,
on the other hand, the battery claim of the plaintiff were to have been based
on the failure of a surgeon to disclose risks and obtain informed consent, the
situation would have been altogether different, and the claim would properly
have been deemed one for medical malpractice.89
D.

Who is a "ProspectiveDefendant"for Purposes of Presuit?

Section 766.106(2) of the FloridaStatutes provides in relevant part that
"[a]fter completion of presuit investigation pursuant to § 766.203 and prior to
filing a claim for medical malpractice, a claimant shall notify each
prospective defendant... of intent to initiate litigation for medical
malpractice." 90 Since the Florida Legislature has not defined what it means
by the cryptic term "prospective defendant," the question arises as to exactly
who was intended to be included within this category of "prospective
defendants" for purposes of section 766.106(2).
A leading case addressing this question is the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision in Weinstock v. Groth.91 In Weinstock, the plaintiff filed
an action against a licensed clinical psychologist. 92 The gravamen of the
complaint was that in 1985, the plaintiff, Suzanne Groth, began receiving
psychotherapy and marriage counseling from the defendant psychologist, Dr.
Ronda Weinstock, and that subsequently, Dr. Weinstock had entered into an
affair with the plaintiffs husband who had attended several of the therapy
sessions.93 The complaint charged Dr. Weinstock with negligence and the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 94 Weinstock then filed a motion
88.

Id.

89. FLA. STAT. § 766.103(3) (1997). See also Gassman v. United States, 589 F. Supp.
1534, 1544-45 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
90. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2) (emphasis added).
91.
629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993).
92. Id. at 836.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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to dismiss the complaint because it failed to allege that the plaintiff had
complied with the presuit notice requirements set forth in section 766.106(2)
of the Act. 9 5 The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, but
the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed on the ground that Dr. Weinstock
was not a "health care provider" under the Act and therefore the presuit
notice requirements did not apply.96 The Supreme Court of Florida noted
that section 766.106(2) does not define the "prospective defendants" to
whom notice must be given. 97 The court explained "[h]owever, it is only
logical that the term refers to defendants in a medical malpractice action who
are health care providers as defined in chapter 766 or who, although not
expressly included within that class, are vicariously liable for the acts of a
health care provider." 98 The court further asserted that "[ilt is clear that
under § 766.102(1) 'prospective defendants' in medical negligence actions
are 'health care providers as defined in [section] 768.50(2)(b)."' 99 The
Weinstock court did not adequately explain why it was so "logical" and
"clear" that the term "prospective defendants" used in section 766.106(2)
was synonymous with the term "health care provider" utilized in section
766.102(1). However, the court's unspoken reasoning was likely to have
been that section 766.102(1) sets forth the applicable standard of care in
actions based on "the negligence of a health care provider as defined in
[section] 768.50(2)(b), ' 'lco which by implication, means actions for medical
malpractice.10 1 Therefore, the "prospective defendants" in an action for
medical malpractice, to which section 766.106(1) refers, must mean the
"health care providers" subject to the medical or professional standard of
care set forth under section 766.102(1). Having posited the principle that the
presuit notice requirement must be satisfied in claims against health care
providers, the court then observed that if Dr. Weinstock was a "health care
provider," then the plaintiff's
complaint was properly dismissed because
10 2
notice had not been given.

95.
96.

Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2)).
Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 836.

97. Id.
98. Id. at 837-38.
99. Id. at 838 (quoting FIA. STAT. § 766.102(1)).
100. FL. STAT. § 766.102(1). See infratext accompanying note 108.
101. The only alternative to this interpretation would be that in section 766.102(1), the
legislature was referring to actions for ordinary negligence when it used the term "negligence of a
health care provider." However, this reading would not make any sense in view of the fact that it
is the prevailing "professional" standard of care which expressly applies under section 766.102(1).
See infra text accompanying note 108.
102. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 836.
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Was Dr. Weinstock a "health care provider?" The Supreme Court of
Florida answered this question in the negative and its reasoning was as
follows:
[A]s both the trial and district courts below noted, psychologists
licensed under chapters 490 and 491, Florida Statutes (1991), are
not included in the chapter 766 definitions of "health care
provider." We agree with the district court below that the
exclusion of psychologists from the various definitions of this term
indicates a legislative intent that psychologists not be classified as
health care providers. This limited construction of the term
precludes the absurd conclusion that clergy and others who provide
counseling similar to that provided by Dr. Weinstock, but who also
care providers, might be subject
are not expressly defined as10health
3
to the provisions of the Act.

The Weinstock court pointed to three different sections of the Act, each
of which contained a definition of the term "health care provider:" 1 4 1)
section 766.101(1)(b); 105 2) section 766.105(1)(b); 1' 6 and 3) section
766.102(1),'0 7 which, in turn, incorporates the definition of health care

103. Id. at 836-37.
104. Id. at 836.

105. FLA. STAT. § 766.101(l)(b) (1997) defines "health care providers" as "physicians
licensed under chapter 458, osteopathic physicians licensed under chapter 459, podiatrists licensed
under chapter 461, optometrists licensed under chapter 463, dentists licensed under chapter 466,
chiropractors licensed under chapter 460, pharmacists licensed under chapter 465, or hospitals or
ambulatory surgical centers licensed under chapter 395." kli
106. FLA. STAT. § 766.105(1)(b) states that:
[t]he term "health care provider" means any: 1) hospital licensed under
chapter 395; 2) physician licensed, or physician assistant certified, under
chapter 458; 3) osteopathic physician licensed under chapter 459; 4)
Podiatrist licensed under chapter 461; 5) health maintenance organization
certificated under part I of chapter 641; 6) ambulatory surgical center licensed
under chapter 395; 7) "[o]ther medical facility" as defined in paragraph (c); 8)
professional association, partnership, corporation, joint venture, or other

association by the individuals set forth in subparagraphs 2., 3., and 4. for
professional activity.

Id.
107. Id. § 766.102(1) provides:
In any action for recovery of damages based on the death or personal injury of

any person in which it is alleged that such death or injury resulted from the
negligence of a health care provider as defined in s. 768.50(2)(b), the

claimant shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight of evidence
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provider set forth in section 768.50(2)(b).l'8 All of these sections contain, in
some cases overlapping and in some respects inconsistent, definitions of the
term "health care provider." For example, section 766.101(1)(b) defines
health care providers to mean "physicians licensed under chapter 458,
osteopathic physicians licensed under chapter 459, podiatrists licensed under
chapter 461, optometrists licensed under chapter 463, dentists licensed under
chapter 466, chiropractors licensed under chapter 460, pharmacists licensed

under chapter 465, or hospitals or ambulatory surgical centers licensed under

chapter 395. ''109 However, section 766.101 deals only with the narrow
subject of immunity from liability of those serving on medical review
committees and with exclusion from discovery of matters arising out of
review performed by such committees." °
The Weinstock court further noted that psychologists were not included
111
within the section 766.105(1)(b) definition of health care provider either.
The absence of psychologists from the section 766.105(1)(b) definition
buttressed the court's conviction that psychologists were not health care
providers entitled to presuit notice." 2 Unlike any of the other sections the
that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the
prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider.
Id. § 766.102(1) (1997) (emphasis added).
108. Interestingly, section 766.102(1) of the Florida Statutes incorporates by express
reference the definition of "health care provider" set forth under now-repealed FLA. STAT. §
768.50(2)(b) (1985) which has the most comprehensive definitions of what a "health care
provider" is:
"Health care provider" means hospitals licensed under chapter 395;
physicians licensed under chapter 458; osteopaths licensed under chapter 459;
podiatrists licensed under chapter 461; dentists licensed under chapter 466;
chiropractors licensed under chapter 460; naturopaths licensed under chapter
462; nurses licensed under chapter 464; clinical laboratories registered under
chapter 483; physicians' assistants certified under chapter 458; physical
therapists and physical therapist assistants licensed under chapter 486; health
maintenance organizations certificated under part II of chapter 641;
ambulatory surgical centers... ; blood banks... ; or ... associations for
professional activity by health care providers.
Id. § 768.50(2)(b) (1985). The Weinstock court noted that section 768.50 had been repealed
"except to the extent that it is incorporated by reference into section 766.102(1)." See
Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 836 n.1.
109. FLA. STAT. § 766.101(1)(b).
110. Id.
111. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 836.
112. Ide at 836-37. Note that in P.W. Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281 (Fla.
1988), the Supreme Court of Florida declared that express mention of one thing in a statute implies
exclusion of another. Id. Nichols was cited by Weinstock for this very proposition. Weinstock,
629 So. 2d at 837. Thus, since the various definitions of health care provider set forth in chapter
766 expressly mention other health care professionals in their definitions of health care provider
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1) health
Weinstock court reviewed, section 766.105(1)(b) includes:
maintenance organizations; 2) professional associations; 3) partnerships,
corporations; 4) joint ventures; and 5) "other medical facilit[ies]" within the
definition of health care providers 1 3 However, section 766.105 deals with
coverage under the "Florida Patient's Compensation Fund," a topic far afield
from presuit requirements or the applicable standard of care.'1
Finally, the court reviewed section 766.102(1), which incorporates the
definition of health care provider set forth under section 768.50(2)(b)." 5
Psychologists, the court stated, were not included in the section 768.50(2)(b)
definition of "health care provider" either." 6 Therefore, the Weinstock court
concluded, the legislature simply could not have intended psychologists to be
health care providers for purposes of entitlement to presuit notice under
section 766.106 in view of their absence from the various definitions of
health care -provider set forth in sections 766.101(1)(b), 766.105(1)(b), and
766.102(1).17 Clearly, the most crucial of the three sections examined by the
court was section 766.102(1)8 because the court stated outright that in
medical malpractice actions, the term "prospective defendants" means health
care providers as defined in section 768.50(2)(b)." 9
but psychologists are not included, this is strong evidence that the Florida Legislature did not
intend psychologists to be considered health care providers for any purpose under chapter 766.
See id.
113. FLA. STAT. § 766.105(l)(b). See supra text accompanying note 106.
114. See FLA. STAT. § 766.105(1)(b). The statute is entitled "Florida Patient's
Compensation Fund." Id. The only relationship between section 766.105 and the presuit
provisions set forth in section 766.106 would seem to be that both statutes are part of the Act.
115. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 837. See supra text accompanying note 108. Again, as
noted earlier, the court observed that section 768.50(2)(b) had been "repealed except to the extent
that it is incorporated by reference into section 766.102(1)." Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 836 n.l.
116. Id. at 836 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.50(2)(b) (1985)).
117. Id By negative implication, it could be argued that if psychologists were listed as
health care providers under any of the three sections the Weinstock court examined, they would be
entitled to presuit notice. This very argument was advanced quite recently in Community Blood
Ctr., Inc. v. Damiano, 697 So. 2d 948, 951 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) and rejected by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal as follows:
The blood bank argues that although the medical malpractice statute of
limitations does not apply to actions against blood banks, plaintiffs
nevertheless were bound to comply with the presuit requirements of chapter
766, including subsection 766.106(2). This subsection requires notice to the
defendant in a medical malpractice action after completion of presuit
screening, "prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice."

Id. at 951.
118. Which incorporates section 766.50(2)(b)'s definition of "health care provider." See
supratext accompanying note 108.
119. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 838.
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Therefore, under Weinstock, we can conclude that if one is included in
the section 768.50(2)(b) definition of "health care provider," then one is a
health care provider and hence a "prospective defendant" for purposes of
entitlement to presuit notice. However in the recent case of Community
Blood Centers v. Damiano,120 the Fourth District Court of Appeal did not
reach that conclusion.'12 In Damiano, the defendant, a blood bank, moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs, who allegedly contracted
AIDS through HIV tainted blood supplied by the blood bank, had failed to
provide presuit notice to the defendant under section 766.106(2) of the
Florida Statutes.122 However, the trial court denied the defendant blood
bank's motion to dismiss.23 In affirming the trial court's decision, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected the blood bank's contention that it
was a health care provider for purposes of presuit.12 4 The defendant pointed
out that blood banks were included in the section 768.50(2)(b) definition of
health care provider and argued that, under Weinstock, it was therefore a
"prospective defendant" entitled to presuit notice under section
766.106(2).125 The appellate court responded to this argument as follows:
"defendant points out that blood banks are defined as a health care provider
under subsection 768.50(2)(b). While that is true, blood banks are listed
nowhere else within the statutory definition of chapter 766; e.g., subsections
766.101(b) and 766.105(1)(b)."
This statement shows that the Damiano
court may have misread Weinstock. The Weinstock court did indeed examine
three different subsections of chapter 766.127 Moreover, the Supreme Court
of Florida did conclude in Weinstock that the absence of psychologists from
any of the various statutory definitions of health care provider showed that
the legislature could not have intended psychologists to occupy the status of
health care provider.'2 However, the Weinstock court never indicated that
one who is defined as a health care provider under section 768.50(2)(b) must
also fall within the section 766.105(1)(b) and/or section 766.101(1)(b)
definition(s) of that term, before one can be considered a prospective
defendant for purposes of presuit notice. In fact, the court in Weinstock
indicated just the opposite in stating unequivocally, "[i]t is clear that...
120. 697 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

121. Id. at 949.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 952.
125. Damiano,697 So. 2d at 951.

126. Id.
127. Weinstock 629 So. 2d at 838 (examining FLA. STAT. §§ 766.101(1)(b); .102 (1),
.105(1)(b)) which expressly incorporates section 768.50(2)(b). See also supratext accompanying

notes 105-08.
128. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 837.
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'prospective defendants' in medical negligence actions are 'health care
providers as defined in [section] 768.50(2)(b). ' ' 29
However, even if the fourth district rendered an unduly restrictive
reading of Weinstock's test for whether one is a health care provider, it had
benevolent motives for doing so. First of all, the majority in Damiano
observed that it was not until June 18, 1996, over four years after plaintiffs
had filed the action, that the blood bank filed its motion to dismiss based on
the plaintiffs' noncompliance with section 766.106(2), presuit requirements.1 30 As Judge Pariente pointed out in his concurring opinion, due to the
defendant's four-year delay in filing the motion to dismiss, it was too late for
plaintiffs to comply with the presuit notice requirements and "plaintiffs now
have no opportunity to cure the defect."' 3' Secondly, aside from this issue of
basic fairness, the Damiano court, citing Weinstock, reiterated the principle
that statutes should be construed in a manner which minimize their effect on
the constitutionally protected right of access to the courts under Article I,
32 In any event, because the court
Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.1
held that the blood bank had not rendered treatment or care to plaintiffs and
thus the claim was not one for medical malpractice, it would have made no
difference in the outcome even if the court had deemed the blood bank to be
a health care provider. 33 From a logical standpoint, it seems nonsensical to
require, as Damiano seems to suggest, that one must not only be listed in
section 768.50(2)(b) in order to be deemed a health care provider for presuit
purposes, but also must be included in one or both of the134
definitions of that
term set forth in section 766.105(1)(b), and 766.101(1)(b).
As the Fifth District Court of Appeal recently noted in Sova Drugs, Inc.
v. Barnes,135 in determining whether "pharmacists" were health care
providers for purposes of the presuit investigation and notice requirements of
section 766.106(2) of the Act:
Other parts of Chapter 766 include pharmacists in the list of
"health care providers".. . [h]owever, their inclusion in this
section [766.101(b)] is for the purpose of providing them immunity
when serving on medical review committees or providing
information in the scope of such a committee function. This
129. Id. at 838 (emphasis added).
130. Damiano,697 So. 2d at 951.
131. Id. at 952 (Pariente, J.,
concurring).
132. Id. (citing Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993)).
133. Id. at 949. See also Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla.
1992) (holding that an action against a blood bank as a supplier of blood was not a medical
malpractice action for statute of limitations purposes).
134. See Damiano,697 So. 2d at 951.
135. 661 So. 2d 393 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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provision has little or 13nothing
to do with filing medical malpractice
6
actions in civil courts.

The Barnes court admonished that "[t]he only sensible approach in
to
interpreting this Chapter [766], is to limit the applicability of each section
137
its own definition of 'health care provider' if there is one provided."
If the legislature did intend the term "prospective defendants" used in
section 766.106(2) to mean "health care providers," its failure to say so or to
define the terms "prospective defendant" and "health care provider" for
purposes of section 766.106(2) has resulted in a lot of confusion. Indeed,
troubled by this confusion, the Second District Court of Appeal was
prompted to observe in NME Properties v. McCulough 38 that "[w]e
have... lamented the difficulty of interpreting chapter 766 because the
This case presents similar
chapter lacks comprehensive definitions.
difficulties."'139 In McCullough, the plaintiff alleged that she entered the
defendant nursing home to recuperate after surgery on her fractured elbow
and that agents or employees of the home negligently treated or handled the
plaintiff causing her to suffer further severe injury to her previously fractured
elbow. 14° The nursing home moved to dismiss because the plaintiff had
failed to comply and plead compliance with the presuit requirements set forth
in sections 766.104, 766.106, and 766.203-06.11 The trial court denied the
motion and the appellate court affirmed the denial, noting that nursing homes
were not included in the definitions of health care provider set forth in
sections 768.50(2)(b), 766.101(1)(b), or 766.105(1)(b) of the Florida
Statutes.142 Moreover, the court explained, the plaintiff had not alleged that
the agents or employees of the nursing home, to whom she ascribed her
negligent treatment or handling, were health care providers.1 43 The court
noted that the agents or employees might merely be orderlies or other
employees without professional status.1 4 - Since presuit requirements can
attach only when the defendant is a health care provider or alleged to be
vicariously liable for the acts of a health care provider and neither situation

136. Id. at 395.
137. Id.
138. 590 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
139. Id. at440 n.1 (citing Catron v. Roger Bohn, D.C., P.A., 580 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1991)).
140. Id. at440.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 440.
144. Id.
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was obtained in this case, the court reasoned that the defendant's motion145
to
dismiss for noncompliance with presuit requirements was properly denied.
What is perplexing is that the McCullough court suggested that presuit
requirements would have been applicable if the plaintiff had alleged that the
harm was caused by a nurse employed by the nursing home. 4' - However,
nurses are not included in the definitions of health care provider set forth in
sections 766.101(1)(b) or 766.105(1)(b) but only in the section 768.50(2)(b)
definition.1 47 Therefore, under McCullough, it would appear that inclusion of
a defendant in the section 768.50(2)(b) definition of a health care provider
would suffice in and of itself to confer health care provider status upon a
defendant for purposes of presuit.' 48 This view is directly at odds with the
approach taken by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Damiano, which
holds that inclusion in the section 768.50(2)(b) definition is not enough by
itself to14cloak
a party with the status of health care provider for purposes of
9
presuit.
In Goldman v. HalifaxMedical Center,Inc.,150 a unique issue was raised
and resolved by the Fifth District Court of Appeal.' 5' In Goldman, the
plaintiff alleged that a hospital was vicariously liable for the negligence of its
employee, a radiologic technologist. 5 2 The plaintiff alleged that the
technologist negligently applied excessive pressure and caused one of her
silicone breast implants to rupture. 153 The plaintiff contended that
compliance with the presuit notice requirements of chapter 766 is not
necessary where the active tortfeasor is not a health care provider under any
of the statutory definitions. 54 Does the requirement of presuit notice apply
to a claim against a hospital based on the negligence of the hospital's
employee who was not a health care provider? The Goldman court's answer
to this question was "yes.' 55 At first blush, this holding seems surprising in
light of the supreme court's proclamation in Weinstock stating, "we conclude
that the notice requirements of the Act only apply in actions against 'health
care providers' as defined in chapter 766, Florida Statutes (1991), and those

145. Id. at440-41.
146. Id. at 440.
147. See FLA. STAT. §§ 766.101(1)(b); .105(1)(b); 768.50(2)(b).
accompanying notes 105-08.
148. McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 440.
149. Damiano,697 So. 2d at 951.
150. 662 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
151. Id. at368.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 368.
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who are vicariously liable for the acts of a health care provider." 156 Without
explicitly saying so, this language suggests that there are only two situations
in which presuit notice is required: 1) in a direct action against a health care
provider based on the provider's own negligence; and 2) in an action against
a party (health care provider or not) based on vicarious liability for the acts
of the defendant's employee or agent who is a health care provider.
However, Goldman's suit against the hospital was grounded in vicarious
liability based upon its employee's alleged negligence in performing a
57 The employee, a radiographic technician, was not included
mammogram.1
in any of the chapter 766 definitions of health care provider.1 58 Nevertheless,
Goldman held that presuit notice requirements applied to the vicarious
liability claim against the hospital.1 59 Arguably, this holding flies in the face
of the apparent restriction imposed by Weinstock that medical negligence
suits founded upon vicarious liability are subject to presuit only when the
underlying employee or agent is a health care provider.16 0 However, the
above quoted language from Weinstock is ambiguous. Again, the Weinstock
court stated that presuit requirements "only apply in actions against 'health
and those who are vicariously liable for the acts of a health
care providers' 161
provider."
care
As the court noted in Goldman, the hospital was defined as a health care
provider under sections 766.101(1)(b), 162 766.105(1)(b), 163 and 766.102(1)
vis-a-vis 768.50(2)(b). 16 The Goldman case clearly involved an action
against a health care provider; therefore, it was argued that presuit notice
requirements should apply. At the same time, the Goldman case was
predicated on vicarious liability based on the negligence of a non-health care
provider. Thus, one could argue that presuit requirements were inapplicable
if the language "vicariously liable, for the acts of a health care provider" was
read to mean that in cases of vicarious liability presuit notice requirements
apply only in instances where the underlying employee or agent is a health
care provider. However, the Goldman court all but ignored the time-honored
edict underscored in the Weinstock, Damiano, and McCullough cases, that
156. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 835-36.
157. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 368.
158. Id. Just as its predecessors in Weinstock, Damiano, and McCullough had done, the
Goldman court specifically examined the definitions of health care provider set forth under
sections 766.101(1)(b); 766.105(1)(b); and 766.102(1) (which incorporates § 768.50(2)(b)'s
definition of health care provider). Id. at 369. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
159. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 370.
160. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 835-36.

161. Id.
162. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 369. See supra text accompanying note 105.
163. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 369. See supra text accompanying note 106.
164. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 369. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
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statutes restricting65access to the courts must be construed in such a manner
that favor access.
In essence, the court in Goldman read Weinstock to say that presuit
requirements apply in three different scenarios: 1) where a health care
provider is alleged to have been directly negligent in the rendering of
medical care or services; 2) where a defendant (whether or not a health care
provider) is alleged to be vicariously liable for the acts of a health care
provider employee or agent; and 3) where a health care provider is alleged to
be vicariously liable for the negligence of a non-health care provider
employee or agent. 66 If scenario three is encompassed in what the
Weinstock court had in mind when it articulated when presuit notice
requirements apply, the following question might arise: If a non-health care
provider is negligent in maintaining the premises, thereby resulting in a
vicarious liability claim against the hospital, would the hospital then be
entitled to presuit notice? Under Goldman, the answer to this question is
"no," because the Goldman court qualified its holding by restricting the
application of presuit requirements in cases of vicarious liability to instances
where the defendant's employee or agent was negligent in the "rendering of
medical care or services.
Because the technician employed by the
hospital in Goldman was engaged in the rendering of medical care or
services when the injury occurred, presuit requirements were held to ap l6y
notwithstanding the fact that the technician was not a health care provider.
The problem is that the Weinstock court's elocution of when a defendant
is entitled to presuit notice was imprecise and misleading.1 69 As a result, the
Goldman court may have had too much leeway to indulge in its own
interpretation of the legislative intent underlying section 766.106, the presuit
notice statute, an interpretation which was somewhat speculative and which
countermanded Florida's strong policy in favor of access to the courts. 1 70 To
complicate matters further, the Goldman holding, to the extent it embraces
claims for vicarious liability based on the negligence of a non-health care
165. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 835-36; Damiano, 697 So. 2d at 951; McCullough, 590 So.
2d at 440. See also FLA. CONST. art. I, sec. 21.
166. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 369-70.
167. Id. at 371.
168. Id.
169. See infra Part IV for a recommendation of how, inter alia, the courts and/or Florida
Legislature can clear up this problem.
170. See FLA. CONST. art. I, sec. 21. The Goldman court believed that Mrs. Goldman's
case was more akin to the claim made in Neilinger where "the court held that a hospital was
[engaged in] performing medical services when a patient slipped and fell on a pool of amniotic
fluid while descending from an examination table under the direction and care of the hospital
employees." See Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 370-71 (citing Neilinger v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 460 So.
2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
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provider within the sphere of presuit, appears to be out-of-sync with the
crucial language of section 766.102(1).
The Weinstock, Damiano,
McCullough, and Goldman decisions all seem to suggest that the simplest
test for when presuit requirements apply is "whether the defendant is directly
or vicariously liable" under the medical negligence standard of care set forth
in section 766.102(1) of the FloridaStatutes.171 However, turning to section

766.102(1), it states that "the prevailing professional standard of care for a
given health care provider shall be that level of care ....
which, in light of all
relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and
appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers., 172 This

suggests that the crux of a malpractice claim is based upon whether a health
care providercomported with an acceptable level of care, skill, and treatment
of other reasonably prudent health careproviders. In Goldman, the case was

not predicated upon whether a health care provider comported with the level
of care, skill, and treatment that would be exercised by other reasonably
prudent health care providers.
The employee technician was not a health

care provider at all.

The standard set forth in section 766.102(1) is

incongruent and thus calls into question whether the claim was one for
medical malpractice for presuit purposes. There could be no "similar health

care provider" to the technician in Goldman; this would be a nonsequitur
since the technician himself was not a health care provider.174
171. See Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993); Community Blood Ctr. of
S. Fla. v. Damiano, 697 So. 2d 948, 951 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Goldman v. Halifax Med.
Ctr., 662 So. 2d 367,369 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1995); NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590
So. 2d 439,440 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
172. FLA. STAT. § 766.102(1) (1997) (emphasis added).
173. Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 369.
174. The Goldman court compared the situation before it to the decision of Broadway v.
Baptist Hosp., Inc., 638 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1994) and Neilinger v. Baptist Hosp.,
Inc., 460 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1984), discussed earlier in this article. Goldman, 662
So. 2d at 370-71. The court distinguished Broadway by noting that the underlying negligence in
that case was not medical negligence. Id. at 370. That is, the plaintiff's claim in Broadway, that
she was injured when her bed collapsed, was found to be based upon ordinary negligence, to wit,
premises liability, rather than upon the negligent rendering of medical care or services. Id.
However, the claim in Goldman, in contradistinction to Broadway, was based upon the negligent
rendering of medical services by the hospital's radiographic technician. Id. The Goldman court
also noted that "Goldman's claim, that an improperly calibrated machine that was used on her
partly caused her injury, is not unlike a claim that one was injured when a doctor used an unclean
scalpel, a claim which would clearly fall within the realm of providing medical care." Id.
The Goldman court believed that Mrs. Goldman's case was more akin to the claim made in
Neilinger where "the court held that a hospital was [engaged in] performing medical services
when a patient slipped and fell on a pool of amniotic fluid while descending from an examination
table under the direction and care of the hospital employees." Goldman, 662 So. 2d at 370, 37071 (citing Neilinger v. Baptist flosp., Inc., 460 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1984)).
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To summarize Part II, the following observations can be made. First,
for the presuit requirements of the Act to apply, the action must be a "[c]laim
for medical malpractice." 175 This means the claim must arise out of "the
rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services."' 176 Discerning
when a claim does arise out of the rendering of, or failure to render, medical
care or services can be a tricky endeavor for attorneys. However, the
Supreme Court of Florida and the district courts of appeal seem to be in
general agreement that a claim arises out of the rendering of, or failure to
render, medical care or services, when the acts or omissions of a health care
provider that caused the injury to the claimant, allegedly fell below the level
of care and treatment that would be considered acceptable and appropriate by
reasonably prudent similar health care providers. 7 7
Second, the prospective defendants in a medical malpractice action to
which section 766.106(2) refers, and who, under that section, are entitled to
presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation, are those defined as health care
providers under section 768.50(2)(b). 78 Reading Weinstock in conjunction
with section 766.106(2), one can conclude that a two-prong test should be
used in determining whether presuit requirements apply: 1) the claim must
be "a claim for medical malpractice;" and 2) the defendant is a "health
care
79
provider" or vicariously liable for the acts of a health care provider.
Finally, since section 766.106(2) is a statute tending to restrict access to
the courts, if there is doubt as to its application, it must be construed in a
manner which favors access.180 We now turn to part three and an exploration
into when the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations set forth
under section 95.1 1(4)(b)18 1 applies to a claim.

175. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a) (1997).
176. Id.
177. See generallyJ.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 635 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1994); Feifer v. Galen
of Florida, Inc., 685 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Broadway v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 638
So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994); NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So. 2d 439
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
178. See supra text accompanying note 108. See also Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 836. It
should be noted that in the Damiano court's view, inclusion of one in the section 768.50(2)0b)
definition of "health care provider" is not enough in and of itself to conclude that one is a
prospective defendant for purposes of presuit. Damiano, 697 So. 2d at 951.
179. See Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 838. See also FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2) (1997). The
Goldman court would modify the second prong of this test by using words to the effect of: the
defendant is a health care provider or vicariously liable for the acts of an agent or employee who
was negligent in the rendering of medical care or services, regardless of whether or not the agent
or employee is himself a health care provider. See generallyGoldman, 662 So. 2d at 370.
180. See Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 835; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
181. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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IH. DETERMINING WHEN THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS APPLIES

A.

An Overview of the Medical MalpracticeStatute of Limitations

The statute of limitations governing claims for medical malpractice is
set forth in section 95.11(4)(b) of the FloridaStatutes and provides: "An
action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the
time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the
time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the
exercise of due diligence .... ,,1s2 The leading case construing the language
of section 95.11(4)(b) is Tanner v. Hartog.8 3 In Tanner, the parents of18a4
stillborn child sued two doctors and a hospital for medical malpractice.
The complaint alleged that on March 31, 1988, the doctors examined Mrs.
Tanner and then sent her to the hospital for testing and that the following
morning the baby was delivered stillborn.185 The Tanners alleged further that
"in light of the testing and Mrs. Tanner's condition, the doctors and the
medical staff at the hospital were negligent in failing to promptly perform a
delivery by caesarian section at a time when the child could have been
saved."' 8 6 Finally, it was alleged that until December 29, 1989, the plaintiffs
neither knew nor should have known that the conduct of the defendants fell
below the applicable medical standard of care.187
The trial court dismissed the lawsuit on the ground that it had not been
filed within the two-year statute of limitations.'88 On appeal, the Second
District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's dismissal on the basis

that the Tanners' claim was time-barred. 8 9 The pivotal question presented to
the Supreme Court of Florida was, when does the statute of limitations begin
to run? 90 The supreme court began its decision by recognizing the lack of
clarity in the language of section 95.11(4)(b) and the need for definitive
judicial construction.'9 The court then revisited its earlier proclamation in

Nardone v. Reynolds, 192 which had been controlling for almost two decades
182. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997). See supra text accompanying note 6.
183. 618 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1993).

184. Id. at 178.
185. IM
186. Id
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 178.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 178-79.
333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976).
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on the issue of what triggers section 95.11(4)(b). 193 The Tanner court noted
that Nardone held the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice suit
begins to run either when the plaintiff has notice of the negligent act or
omission giving rise to the cause of action or when the plaintiff has notice of
the physical injury. 194 However, in Tanner, the supreme court placed an
interpretation on the Nardone rule intending to ameliorate the harsh results
which can sometimes occur by strict application of the rule. 195
We hold that the knowledge of the injury as referred to in the
[Nardone] rule as triggering the statute of limitations means not
only knowledge of the injury but also knowledge that there is a
reasonable possibility that the injury was caused by medical
malpractice. The nature of the injury, standing alone, may be such
that it communicates the possibility of medical negligence, in
which event the statute of limitations will immediately begin to run
upon discovery of the injury itself. On the other hand, if the injury
is such that it is likely to have occurred from natural causes, the
statute will not begin to run until such time as there is reason
to
19 6
believe that medical malpractice may possibly have occurred.
The court reasoned that "[m]ere knowledge of a stillbirth, without more,
would not suggest the possibility of medical negligence" since stillbirths
often occur even in the absence of negligence.
Therefore, the supreme
court reversed the dismissal of the Tanner's claim, which was predicated on
the assumption that the Tanner's knowledge of the stillbirth alone triggered
the statute."9 '
While the Tanner court's updated interpretation of the Nardone rule is
unquestionably more equitable than its former strict application, it is far from
definitive. The term "reasonable possibility" that an injury was caused by
medical malpractice is a term of art woefully in need of, but perhaps
incapable of, precise definition. At what point does a layman become aware
of a reasonable possibility that his injury was the product of medical
malpractice? Laymen rarely, if ever, read medical journals. A treating
physician or surgeon is quite unlikely to refer a patient to another doctor for
the purpose of ascertaining whether he made mistakes, particularly in view of
193. Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 179 (citing Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976)).
194. Id. (citing Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976)). This was commonly
known as the "Nardone rule" and/or the "discovery rule." See also Barron v. Shapiro, 565 So. 2d
1319 (Fla. 1990) (reaffirming the Nardone rule).
195. Tanner,618 So. 2d at 181.
196. Id. at 181-82 (footnotes omitted).
197. Maat 182.
198. Id. at 184.
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the fear of being sued for malpractice and the modem prevalence of health
management organizations which foster a reluctance to make referrals of any
kind. The Tanner court was mindful of the difficulties involved when it
observed:
We recognize that our holding will make it harder to decide as a
matter of law when the statute begins to run and may often require
a fact-finder to make that determination ... [t]he point at which the
statute [begins] to run can only be determined after the pertinent
facts have been developed. 199
Since they "neither knew nor should have known 'that the actions and
inactions of the defendants fell below the standard of care recognized in the
community' until December 29, 1989" (almost two years after the stillbirth),
it is reasonable to assume that some doctor(s) made the Tanners aware of the
reasonable _possibility that the stillbirth was the consequence of
malpractice. 20 Realistically, how else could they have achieved such
awareness?
Obviously, an attorney cannot even begin to investigate or assess the
viability of a potential malpractice claim until a client shows up at the
attorney's office (or at least calls) and informs the attorney that he or she has
suffered an injury. It would seem logical that by that time, the client has at
least an inkling of a suspicion that the injury or condition was caused by
medical malpractice, but not necessarily so. For example, the client may
have been in, say, an automobile accident and is merely consulting a lawyer
to determine his legal rights vis-t-vis other drivers involved in the collision
and their insurers. However, perhaps unbeknownst to the client, his injury
may have been diagnosed incorrectly or he may have been mistreated,
leading to aggravated or still further injury. Still, in such an instance, it
would appear that the statute has not commenced, unless a reasonable person
would 20be aware of the possibility of malpractice purely from the nature of the
injury. '
In any event, the most prudent course of action for a plaintiffs' attorney
(whether or not the client actually believes himself to have been the victim of
malpractice) is to maintain a healthy suspicion that medical malpractice may
have been at least partially responsible for the client's injury. Hence, if the
attorney believes the client was blind to what a reasonable person (albeit not
this particular client) may have believed to be malpractice, the attorney can
make a relatively accurate determination of when the statute began to run and
199. Id at 182.
200. Tanner,618 So. 2d at 178.
201. See id.
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act accordingly. The event that triggers the statute is awareness of a
"reasonable possibility" of medical malpractice 20 2 which appears to be an
objective standard and counsel should not assume that his client does or does
not have the awareness that a "reasonable person" would have under the
same circumstances. Good faith ignorance will not erase the disastrous
results of unreasonableness when it comes to malpractice statute of
limitations.
As the Supreme Court of Florida pointed out in Tanner, there are certain
injuries, the nature of which, standing alone, communicate the possibility of
medical negligence in which case the statute begins to run immediately upon
discovery of the injury itself.20 3 Since the term "reasonable possibility" is
intrinsically nebulous, it is hard to predict what a fact-finder will conclude.
Pointed questions in the client interview will help greatly in flushing out the
possibility of malpractice. If the client reveals to the attorney that he has
already been advised by a doctor that some other health care provider may
have erred in diagnosing, treating, or caring for the client, then under Tanner,
the statute would have commenced when the client acquired such
knowledge. 2° Since the hour glass has been turned, so to speak, the attorney
should then act quickly to ensure the claim is filed in a timely fashion, if that
is still possible.2 5 Recall that the plaintiff may petition the clerk of the court
for an automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations in order
that before filing suit, he may conduct a reasonable investigation, obtain a
corroborating opinion2 °6and prepare the notice of intent to initiate litigation for
medical malpractice.
In order to help illustrate how section 95.11(4)(b) will be interpreted
under Tanner, consider the following hypothetical. Assume that on February
202. Id.
203. Id. at 180.
204. Id. at 178. Since the cases offer no clear-cut definition of what constitutes awareness
of a reasonable possibility of malpractice, the practitioner should assume that the client has
developed such awareness if there is any doubt whatsoever.
205. If however, nothing indicates that a client has knowledge, or reasonably should have
knowledge of a possibility of malpractice, but is consulting a lawyer for some unrelated reason,
such as an accident or food poisoning, the client should still be thoroughly interviewed regarding
any medical services received to date. If it appears to the attorney that malpractice might have
transpired, the attorney would be well advised to send the client to board certified specialists for
the purposes of flushing out possible medical malpractice. If the consulting specialist(s) then that
determines there is a reasonable possibility of malpractice, the attorney will not only have
knowledge that there is a viable claim for malpractice, but an expert witness to support the claim.
Most importantly, the attorney will be able to document the point in time at which the client
became aware of the existence of a claim and will be in a good position to refute defense
contentions that the statute began to run at an earlier date.
206. See supra Part II.A for a discussion on the filing of the notice of intent which will toll
the statute for an additional ninety days.
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15, 1995, a client consulted a chiropractor for back pain and that the
chiropractor diagnosed his condition as "sciatica. ' 2°7 Unbeknownst to the
client, this diagnosis was erroneous and the client's back pain was actually
due to a benign tumor which the chiropractor failed to diagnose even though
a simple x-ray would have revealed the tumor. Assume that the client had no
reason to know of the misdiagnosis until December 30, 1995, when she was
informed by a specialist of the tumor which now required surgery due to the
delay in diagnosing it. Assume further that surgery was then performed to
remove the tumor on January 15, 1996, but on the day following the surgery,
the client learned that the surgeon left a sponge in the client's body which, in
turn, caused immediate complications.
Under Tanner, the statute of limitations would not have started to run on
the client's misdiagnosis claim against the chiropractor until December 30,
1995. That was the day the client learned that his back pain was due to an
undiagnosed tumor rather than sciatica and that because the tumor had gone
undiagnosed, surgery was required. In other words, on December 30, 1995,
the client became aware of his injury and of a reasonable possibility that the
injury was caused by medical malpractice. 2 8 However, the injury resulting
from the sponge in the client's body is a different matter. This injury was of
a nature, standing alone, as the Tanner court put it, "that it communicates the

207. Defined as "[plain in the lower back and hip radiating down the back of the thigh into
the leg, initially attributed to sciatic nerve dysfunction." See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1580 (26th ed. 1995).
208. See Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 180. See also Higgs v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 654
So. 2d 624, 626-27 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995). In Higgs, the First District Court of Appeal applied
the Tannerrule to a claim for malpractice based on misdiagnosis and observed:
There has been some confusion concerning what constitutes discovery of the
incident under the statute. In Barron v. Shapiro, 565 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1990),
the supreme court reaffirmed a principle originally stated in Nardone v.
Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976), that the "limitation period commences
when the plaintiff should have known either of the injury or the negligent
act." That interpretation of Nardone, however, could lead to some unjust
results. In Tanner, the supreme court further clarified the Nardone rule, and
held that "the knowledge of the injury as referred to in the [Nardone] rule as
triggering the statute of limitations means not only knowledge of the injury
but also knowledge that there is a reasonable possibility that the injury was
caused by medical malpractice."
Higgs, 654 So. 2d at 626-27 (quoting Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d. 177 (Fla. 1993) (footnotes
and citations omitted)). The Higgs court added that "[iut, thus, appears that the position of this
court is that a misdiagnosis will constitute evidence that a plaintiff did not have knowledge
that the injury was caused by negligence until the plaintiff received a correct diagnosis." Id. at
627.
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possibility of medical negligence, in which event the statute of20limitations
9
will immediately begin to run upon discovery of the injury itself.
No matter how promising a claim for medical malpractice might be, all
will be lost if the claim is dismissed for failure to meet the requirements of
the applicable statute of limitations. In most civil litigation this simply
means that the plaintiff must file the complaint before the limitations period
expires. However, in the arena of medical malpractice it means something
more. Section 766.106(4) of the FloridaStatutes provides in pertinent part
that "[t]he notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time
limits set forth in [section] 95.11.,,210 Therefore, the plaintiff must not only
have his complaint on file before the statute runs but also must serve the
notice of intent prior to the running of the statute. 21' Compliance with presuit
notice requirements is a condition precedent to filing a complaint and failure
to comply with the notice requirements within the limitations period justifies
dismissal of the complaint with prejudice even if the complaint was
otherwise timely filed.
Therefore, attorneys should serve the notice of
intent and the accompanying corroborating opinion prior to filing the
complaint.
We now turn to the critical question of under what circumstances does
the two-year statute of limitations apply to a claim. That question will be
addressed through an exploration and analysis of relevant statutory and case
law.
B.

Survey and Legal Analysis of Statutory and Case Law

Under section 95.1 1(4)(b) of the FloridaStatutes, there is a two-part test
for determining whether an action for medical malpractice exists and thus,
whether that claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations of section
95.11(4)(b): 1) whether the action arises out of "medical... diagnosis,
treatment, or care;" and 2) whether such diagnosis, treatment, or care was
rendered by a "provider of health care. 213 Two relatively recent supreme
209. Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 181-82.
210. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(4) (1997).
211. Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 181.
212. See Williams v. Campagnulo, 588 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1991); Lynn v. Miller, 498 So. 2d
1011 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
213. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997). See also supra text accompanying note 6. It
should be noted that a cause of action against one who is not a health care provider would fall
within the ambit of medical malpractice if the defendant is in privity with a health care provider
who has rendered tortious medical diagnosis, treatment, or care. § 95.11(4)(b). Thus, the twoyear statute of limitations and presuit requirements would also be applicable to claims against the
non-health care provider in privity with a health care provider. § 95.11(4)0b).
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court decisions, Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank2 14 and Kelley v.
Rice215 make it clear that both prongs of the test must be met before a claim
may properly be considered as one for medical malpractice for purposes of
of limitations set forth in section 95.11(4)(b) of the
the two-year statute
16
Statutes.
Florida
C.

What Constitutesan "Actionfor MedicalMalpractice"for Purposesof
the Statute of Limitations?

In Silva v. Southwest FloridaBlood Bank, Inc.,217 the plaintiff sued a
blood bank for supplying HIV tainted blood for transfusions administered to
his wife while she was in the hospital.2 18 Plaintiff's wife subsequently
contracted the HIV virus and died of AIDS as a result of the transfusion.2 9
The blood bank argued that the suit was one sounding in medical malpractice
and that it was therefore subject to the two-year statute of limitations, which
had already expired.220 The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed.221 First, the
court concluded that under the plain and unambiguous language of section
95.11(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes, the blood bank had not rendered
diagnosis, treatment, or care of plaintiffs decedent.222 That is to say, the
blood bank had not engaged in ascertaining the decedent's "medical
condition through examination and testing" (diagnosis),m "prescribing and
administering a course of action to affect a cure" (treatment),224 or "meeting
the patient's daily needs during the illness" (care). 22 5 Indeed, the court noted
214. 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1992).
215. 670 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
216. See Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1992); Kelley v.
Rice, 670 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
217. Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1184 (Fla. 1992).
218. Idat 1186.
219. Il
220. Id at 1187-89.
221. Idat 1189.
222. Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1189.
223. Id. at 1187.
224. Id.
225. Id. The Silva court also utilized alternative definitions for the terms diagnosis,
treatment, or care, borrowing from Webster's Third International Dictionary (1981), which defines
"diagnosis" as "the art or act of identifying a disease from its signs and symptoms," "treatment' as
"the action or manner of treating a patient medically or surgically," and "care" as "to provide for
" Id (quoting WEBsm's TnIR
or attend to needs or perform necessary personal services ....
INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY (1981)). The Silva court further stated that in medical terms,
"diagnosis" means "[tihe determination of the nature of a disease;" "treatment" means "[m]edical
or surgical management of a patient;" and "care" means "the application of knowledge to the
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that the blood bank had not dealt with the recipient patient at all and, in
reality, was nothing more than a supplier of a product. 22 6 As such, the claim
against the blood bank fell outside the definition of an action for medical
malpractice under section 95.11(4)(b) and hence was not subject to section
95.11(4)(b)'s two-year limitations period.227 This section of the Silva court's
opinion was clear, understandable, and well-reasoned.
Another recent case, Kelley v. Rice, 8 underscores the distinction for
statute of limitations purposes between claims based upon ordinary
negligence and claims for medical negligence. 29 In Kelley, the plaintiff was
a former inmate of the Pinellas County Jail. 230 She alleged that on June 14,
1990, she was taken into custody by the Pinellas County Sheriff, Everitt
Rice, after having received emergency treatment for a leg laceration at a local
hospital. 231 Kelley set forth two separate counts of negligence against Sheriff
Rice in her complaint. 232 In Count I, Kelley alleged that Rice was vicariously
liable for the medical negligence of his agent, ARA Health Services,
Incorporated ("ARA").233 Kelley alleged that ARA and Rice had a joint
venture agreement whereby ARA was to provide medical services to inmates
of the jail and that ARA was negligent in its diagnosis, treatment, and care of
the condition from which Kelley was suffering, to wit, infection and
necrotizing fascitis, 234 resulting in injury to inmate Kelley.235
The gravamen of Count II of Kelley' s complaint was that, at all material
times, the plaintiff was in custody of the defendant Sheriff Rice. 2 36 Kelley
alleged that her detention was such that she was unable to care for her own
well-being relative to the need for medical care and that her ability to obtain
medical care was at the sole discretion of her custodian, Sheriff Rice. 7
Kelley further alleged in Count II that Rice had a duty to use reasonable care
in providing her access to necessary medical care, but he breached this duty
benefit of... [an] individual." Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1187 (quoting STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIoNARY 428 (25th ed. 1990)).
226. Id.
227. Id at 1188-89; FLA.STAT. § 95.1 l(4)(b) (1997); see also Community Blood Ctrs. of
S. Fla., Inc. v. Damiano, 697 So. 2d 948, 949-50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a
blood bank was not a health care provider for purposes of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act).
228. 670 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
229. Id at 1095.
230. Id
231. Id
232. Id
233. Kelley, 670 So. 2d at 1095.
234. Defined as tissue death such as that associated with group A streptococcus infection.
See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 632 (26th ed. 1996).
235. Kelley, 670 So. 2d at 1095.
236. Id
237. Id.
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by keeping her detained, thus denying her the opportunity to receive such
care.21 The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that her claims were barred by the statute of
limitations governing medical malpractice.239 The Second District Court of
Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that while Count I of
Kelley's complaint was clearly a claim for medical malpractice which had
not been timely filed within the two-year statutory period, Count II was
based upon a breach of Defendant Rice's custodial duties and was
consequently subject to the four-year statute of limitations applying to claims
of ordinary negligence, which had not yet expired.24° The Kelley court
reasoned as follows:
[w]e conclude that paragraphs sixteen through eighteen, twentyone and twenty-two C. allege facts that sufficiently bring into
question appellee Rice's proper performance of his custodial
obligations to appellant outside of any vicarious obligations arising
from the medical care he contracted to be provided by ARA. In
the performance of his custodial duties, appellee was not
necessarily providing "diagnosis, treatment, or care" as
contemplated by the medical malpractice statute of limitations,
section 95.11(4)(b). We further conclude that under the reasoning
of Silva, the essential allegations of appellant's Count II relating to
appellee's alleged simple negligence do not bring appellee within
the two-pronged test of the medical malpractice statute of
limitations. Those allegations of Count II do not seek relief from
appellee as a "health care provider," nor do they seek relief from
injuries that arise out of appellee's medical, dental or surgical
diagnosis, treatment or care. 24

238. Id.
239. Id.; see FLA

STAT.

§ 95.11(4)(b) (1997).

240. Kelley, 670 So. 2d at 1096-97.
241. Id. at 1096-97 (citing Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla.
1992)). The Kelley court noted that it found the reasoning of its prior decision in NMIE Properties,
Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So. 2d 439, 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) controlling. Kelley, 670
So. 2d at 1097. In NME Properties,the court made the following distinction:
[a]lthough a nursing home is not itself a health care provider for purposes of
section 766.102, it may be vicariously liable under that higher standard of
care for the acts of some of its agents or employees. For example, East
Manor probably employs nurses who are licensed under chapter 464. Under
respondeat superior,East Manor may be liable under the higher professional
standard of care when its agent, who is actively involved in the incident, is a
health care provider rendering medical care or service. On the other hand,
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The teaching of decisions like Silva and Kelley is that although injury
may occur in a medical setting, a health care provider may nevertheless wear
two different hats: one being that of a health care provider who has rendered
negligent diagnosis, treatment, or care; the other being that of one who
happens to be a health care provider, but who has breached a duty to exercise
reasonable care independent of his duty to render diagnosis, treatment, or
care in accordance with the applicable medical standard of care. 242 Of
course, if there are distinct and severable claims, as was the case in Kelley,
each claim can be pursued with the medical standard of care applying to one
and an ordinary negligence standard applying to the other. 243 Ultimately, the
complaint will either be tested by a defense motion to dismiss one or both
claims, or the plaintiff may have to make an election244at trial and present
proof in accordance with the appropriate legal standard.
For example, very recently in Lynn v. Mount Sinai Medical Center,
Inc.,245 the Third District Court of Appeal held that a hospital's mislabeling
of a urine sample used to screen for drugs did not constitute medical
malpractice for purposes of section 95.11(4)(b). 246 The court noted that the
labeling of a urine sample under a detailed collection protocol supplied by
Dade County did not constitute the rendering of "medical diagnosis,
treatment, or care." 47 The Lynn court reasoned as follows:

East Manor may be liable under an ordinary negligence standard of care when
other nonprofessional employees commit alleged negligence, or when an
incident does not involve medical care.
McCullough, 590 So. 2d at 441.
242. See generally FLA. STAT. § 766.102 (1997).
243. See Kelley, 670 So. 2d at 1095.
244. In Feifer v. Galen of Fla., Inc., 685 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996), the court
made the following admonition:
[w]e would caution plaintiffs in those actions where they allege that a medical
care provider has committed an act of ordinary negligence that they will not
be allowed, in presenting their case, to slide back and forth between the
standards of care and proof required to show ordinary negligence as opposed
to medical negligence.
Id at 885. This pronouncement strongly suggests that plaintiffs will have to elect between two
inconsistent theories and that plaintiffs will not be permitted to attribute the knowledge and skill
that a health care provider should have in assessing whether the defendant breached his duty under
ordinary negligence standards. The problem with proceeding on two different theories arising out
of the same identical set of facts is that the jury would have to apply two diametrically opposed
standards of care. This would hopelessly blur the distinction between ordinary negligence and
medical negligence and render absurd results under Florida's Medical Malpractice Reform Act.
245. 92 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
246. Id. at 1002; see FLA.STAT. § 95.1 l(4)(b) (1997).
247. Lynn, 692 So. 2d at 1004.
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Merely because a wrongful act occurs in a medical setting does not
necessarily mean that it involves medical malpractice. The
wrongful act must be directly related to the improper application of
medical services, and the use of professional judgment or skill. 248
Mt. Sinai did not engage in any medical skill or judgment by
collecting and shipping out urine specimens to an independent
laboratory, because it only functioned as an intermediary following
the strict guidelines set by the County. Moreover, Mt. Sinai did
not even test the samples they collected. Additionally, a
"diagnosis" under the statute [§ 95.11(4)(b)] is interpreted as
"ascertaining a patient's medical condition through examination
and testing, prescribing and administering a course of action to
effect a cure, and meeting the patient's daily needs during the
illness." This applies to patients submitting to tests in order to
diagnose illnesses. By contrast, the urine samples were not
analyzed at all, but only screened for drugs as per the hospitals
agreement with the county.
Consequently, as no professional skill or judgment was performed
by Mt. Sinai, the collection of the urine sample was not a medical
service as defined by the statute... Therefore, the liability of the
care in not
hospital stems from a breach of the duty of ordinary
249
following the protocol required by Dade County.
The Lynn court's reasoning is sound. The court noted that in Silva, the
supreme court defined "diagnosis" to mean "'ascertaining a patient's medical
condition through examination and testing."' 2 0° The court noted that Mt.
Sinai collected Ms. Lynn's urine and then capped, labeled, and sealed the
specimen. 1 In merely collecting the samples and sending them off to an
independent laboratory for testing, Mt. Sinai performed no diagnosis,
treatment, or care under section 95.11(4)(b) or Silva. 2 However, using this
rationale, if Mt. Sinai had performed the test on the sample of urine it
collected from the plaintiff and made an error in analyzing it, which then led
to her loss of employment, the claim should clearly be deemed one for
medical malpractice. Testing and analyzing urine for the presence of drugs is
248. Id. at 1003.
249. Id. at 1004 (citations and parentheticals omitted).
250. Id. (quoting Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184, 1187 (Fla.
1992)).

251. Id. at 1003.
252. Id. at 1004; see Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1184 (Fla. 1992); see also FLA. STAT. §

95.11(4)(b) (1997).
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a diagnostic process in that its end goal is the ascertainment of the testee's
condition.
J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hospital,253 which was discussed in Part II of this
article in reference to the applicability of presuit requirements, also provides
an excellent example of a claim which falls outside the ambit of a claim for
medical malpractice for purposes of the medical malpractice statute of
In J.B., it was alleged that a hospital requested the plaintiff to
limitations.
transport his brother, a patient of the hospital, to another medical facility.2 55
Unknown to the plaintiff, his brother had AIDS, and the hospital failed to
warn the plaintiff that if he came into contact with his brother's open wounds
he could become HIV positive.256 The plaintiffs hands, which had cuts on
them, then came into contact with his brother's wound and consequently, the
plaintiff became HIV positive. 5 7 The J.B. court addressed, inter alia, the
issue of whether the two year statute of limitations for medical malpractice
set forth in section 95.11(4)(b) barred the plaintiff's claim for negligence
against the hospital. 5 8 The court began its analysis by noting that, to be
subject to section 95.1 1(4)(b), a claim must constitute "an action for medical
malpractice."25 9 The court then took note of the definition of an action for
medical malpractice set forth in section 95.11(4)(b), which provides: "[a]n
'action for medical malpractice' is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for
damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising
out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any
provider of health care. '26
The "key inquiry" for the court was whether the plaintiffs action
"'ar[ose] out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or
care. ' ' ,2 6 1 Noting that it had recently addressed the issue of whether a suit
constituted medical malpractice for statute of limitations purposes in Silva,
the J.B. court reiterated the definition of the terms "diagnosis," "treatment,"
and "care" that it had articulated in Silva.262
First, there is no ambiguity to clarify in the words "diagnosis,"
"treatment," or "care," and we find that these words should be
253. 635 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1994).
254. Id. at 946.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 947
258. J.B., 635 So. 2d at 946.
259. Id. at 947 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997)).
260. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997)).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 948 (citing Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184, 1184
(Fla. 1992)).
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accorded their plain and unambiguous meaning. In ordinary,
common parlance, the average person would understand
"diagnosis, treatment, or care" to mean ascertaining a patient's
medical condition through examination and testing, prescribing
and administering a course of action to effect a cure, and meeting
the patient's daily needs during the illness. This parallels the
dictionary definitions of those terms. According to Webster's
Third InternationalDictionary (1981) "diagnosis" means "the art

or act of identifying a disease from its signs or symptoms."
"Treatment" means "the action or manner of treating a patient
medically or surgically." "Care" means "provide for or attend to
needs or perform necessary personal services .... ." Likewise, in
medical terms, "diagnosis" means "[t]he determination of the
nature of a disease." 'Treatment" means "[m]edical or surgical
management of a patient." And "care" means "the application of
knowledge to the benefit of... [an] individual. 263
Finding Silva to be "dispositive," the J.B. court held that just as the blood
bank in Silva had rendered no diagnosis, treatment, or care to the plaintiffs
there, Sacred Heart Hospital had rendered no diagnosis,
treatment, or care to
264
J.B., who was the injured party in the case before it.
The J.B. decision places an important limitation on the definition of
diagnosis, treatment, or care. After all, in the broad sense, the injury in J.B.
did arise out of the treatment, diagnosis, and care of someone. However, that
"someone" was J.B.'s brother, who was the hospital's patient, not J.B. The
hospital diagnosed J.B.'s brother's condition to the extent it had ascertained
that he had the condition of AIDS and determined that he would need to be
sent to another hospital. Sacred Heart treated J.B.'s brother by dressing and
putting a heparin lock on his wounds. 265 Arguably, Sacred Heart was
engaged in care even in the very process of transferring J.B.'s brother to
another hospital. The hospital gave J.B. instructions on how to handle the
heparin lock covering his brother's infectious wounds, 266 and in a sense, it
made J.B. its proxy for the rendering of care. Arguably, but for the
diagnosis, treatment, and/or care rendered by the hospital to J.B.'s brother,
J.B. would not have been in a car in close contact with his brother during the
transfer. Nevertheless, the crux of the J.B. holding is that the hospital had
simply not rendered diagnosis, treatment, or care to J.B .267 Therefore, J.B.' s
263. See J.B., 635 So. 2d at 948 (quoting Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.
2d 1184, 1187 (Fla. 1992)) (citations omitted).

264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id. at 946.
Id. at 947.
Id. at 948.
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claim was not "an action for medical malpractice" that would be barred
under section 95.11 (4)(b).268
One of the most interesting legal aspects of the J.B. decision is that it
also addressed the issue of whether J.B.'s claim was a "claim for medical
malpractice" for purposes of whether the presuit notice requirements of
section 766.106 of the Florida Statutes applied to J.B.'s claim. 269 In so
doing, the court utilized not the definition of "an action for medical
malpractice" set forth in section 95.11 (4)(b), 270 but the definition of "a claim
for medical malpractice" embodied in section 766.106(1)(a). 27' The latter
section defines "a claim for medical malpractice" as "a claim arising out of
the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services. 272 The
J.B. court's resolution of this issue was perfunctory. As noted earlier, in Part
II of this article, the court observed that the complaint did not allege that
Sacred Heart Hospital was negligent in any way in the rendering of, or the
failure to render, medical care, or services. 273 Accordingly, the court went on
to conclude that "the complaint does not state a medical malpractice claim
for chapter 766 purposes, and the notice and presuit screening requirements
are inapplicable. 27
In light of J.B., several questions come to mind. First, is there any
difference between an "action" for medical malpractice as per the section
95.11(4)(b) 275 definition, and a "claim" for medical malpractice, the term
used in the section 766.106(1)(a) 276 definition? Although there is a legal
distinction between the two terms, it does not appear to be a material one. Is
there any reason for this subtle terminology? Generally, an "action" in its
usual legal sense means a "lawsuit brought in court" wherein one or more
claims can be asserted, while a claim is one particular "cause of action"
alleged in an action.277 While a claim is then a subset of an action in which
potentially there could be many claims asserted, there is nothing in the
legislative history of section 95.11(4)(b) and 766.106(1)(a) or the case law to
explain why (if indeed there was any reason) the legislature chose to phrase
the respective definitions as it did.

268. J.B., 635 So. 2d at 947; see FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997).
269. J.B., 635 So. 2d at 948-49.
270. FLA. STAT. § 95.1 1(4)(b)(1997). See supra text accompanying note 6.
271. J.B., 635 So. 2d at 948 (citing FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a) (1997)).
272. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a) (1997)). See supra Part lI.A for a
comprehensive discussion of this definition and its application.
273. Id.
274. Id. at949. See § 766.106(1)(a).
275 See FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (4)(b). See supra text accompanying note 6.
276. See id. § 766.106(1)(a).
277. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 28, 247 (6th ed. 1990).
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Second, assuming for purposes of a comparative discussion, the terms
"claim" and "action" are synonymous, there is no apparent reason why a
claim for medical malpractice under section 766.106(1)(a) should be defined
in different terms than it is under section 95.11(4)(b). The question is, if a
claim arises out of "the rendering of, or failure to render medical care or
services," 278 does it arise out of "medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis,
treatment, or care by any provider of health care?" 279 While at times, the
answer to this question would surely have to be "yes, 28 ° this question has
never been addressed, no less definitively resolved.
Under section
95.11(4)(b), it appears that a claim for malpractice cannot arise out of
negligent diagnosis, treatment, or care of one who is not a health care
provider.2 1 Thus, under the holding of Lynn, for purposes of section
766.106's presuit provisions, the negligence of a radiographic technician
(who was clearly not a health care provide under any chapter 766 definition)
can serve as the predicate of a claim for medical malpractice against the
hospital for whom he worked. 2
However, for purposes of section
95.11(4)(b), the medical malpractice statute of limitations, a claim based
upon the technician's negligence might not be considered an action for
medical malpractice because the action did not arise out of the negligent
diagnosis, treatment, or care of a "health careprovider" as mandated by the
section 95.11(4)(b) definition.283 Is there any rational basis for a distinction
whereby a claim could be characterized as one for "medical malpractice" for
purposes of presuit requirements, but not for statute of limitations purposes?
Not in this writer's view. To add to the confusion, we know that under both
subsections (sections 95.11(4)(b) and 766.106(1)(b)), neither presuit
requirements nor the malpractice statute of limitations apply unless the claim
is against a "health care provider" (or in the case of presuit, one who is
vicariously liable for the acts of a "health care provider"). Yet, as will
become apparent in the following subsection of this article, the definition of
"health care provider" is radically different for purposes of determining
whether presuit requirements apply than it is in cases where the issue is
whether the medical malpractice statute of limitations applies. Indeed, we
shall see that there is currently nothing to indicate, either in the Florida
Statutes, the underlying legislative history, or the case law precisely who

278. See FLA. STAT. § 766.106(a)(1).
279. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b). See supra text accompanying note 6.
280. For example, when a physician negligently misdiagnosis a patient resulting in injury
to the patient, "diagnosis" is clearly a type of "medical service."
281. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997). See supra text accompanying note 6.
282. Lynn v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., Inc., 629 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.

1997).
283. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b). See supra text accompanying note 6.
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and/or what is considered to be a health care provider for purposes of section
95.11(4)(b).
One thing we can glean from the case law is that unless a claim arises
out of negligence in the exercise of professional judgment and skill it will not
be considered one for medical malpractice either within the meaning of
section 766.106(1)(a) or 95.11(4)(b).
Still, the fact that practitioners may,
at times, be able to clearly identify when a claim is not a claim for medical
malpractice does not alleviate the need to know when a claim is one for
medical malpractice. Under section 95.11(4)(b) and Silva, before a claim is
subject to the medical malpractice statute of limitations it must satisfy a two
prong test: 1) it must arise out of "medical diagnosis, treatment, or care;"
and 2) "whether such diagnosis, treatment, or care was rendered by a
'provider of health care.' 28 Accordingly, we shall now turn to the subject
of the second prong of the test, to wit, what is the meaning of the term
"health care provider" for purposes of section 95.11(4)(b) of the Florida
Statutes?
D.

Who is a "Health Care Provider"forPurposesof the Medical
MalpracticeStatute of Limitations?

Although the Silva court deemed the finding that the blood bank had not
rendered medical diagnosis, treatment, or care to the plaintiff to be
dispositive, it seized the opportunity to address and reject the blood bank's
contention that it was a "provider of health care" within the meaning of
section 95.11(4)(b).28 6 The defendant argued that it was a health care
provider because section 768.50(2)(b) expressly characterized blood banks as
such.287 However, the court concluded that the blood bank was not a "health
care provider," reasoning that the plaintiffs' claim was not governed by the
Act or the accompanying two-year statute of limitations. 288 Instead, the court
held, the four-year statute governing claims for ordinary negligence
applied.289
What is most interesting is that in Silva, the Supreme Court of Florida
had eschewed the section 768.50(2)(b) definition of "health care provider,"
that it embraced in Weinstock two years later, noting that section
768.50(2)(b) pertained only to collateral sources of indemnity and had been
284. See §§ 95.11(4)(b),766.106.
285. Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 1992); FLA.
STAT. § 95.11(4)(b).
286. Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1188.
287. Id.
288. lit
289. Icd (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(a) (1989)).
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repealed in 1986.290 The Silva court held that for purposes of whether an
action is governed by the section 95.11(4)(b) statute of limitations for claims
of medical malpractice, the legislature could not have intended the section
because that section
768.50(2)(b) definition of health care provider to apply 291
did not exist when section 95.11(4)(b) was promulgated.
How, if at all, can the holdings of Silva and Weinstock, neither of which
has been disapproved by the court, be reconciled? Reading between the
lines, the answer, while somewhat cryptic, if not totally anomalous, would
appear to be that, for purposes of the issue of whether a claim is subject to
the presuit requirements of the Act, the section 768.50(2)(b) definition of
health care provider is still relevant, while for purposes of whether the twoyear statute of limitations for medical malpractice of section 95.11(4)(b)
applies, the section 768.50(2)(b) is inapplicable.2 92 The only thing that
emerges as clear is that both the statutory scheme and the court's
interpretation of it are sadly in need of legislative overhaul and clarification.
While telling us the section 768.50(2)(b) is inapposite in the determination of
who is a "health care provider" for purposes of section 95.11(4)(b), Silva
gives us no clue whatsoever as to what section of the Act to look to or what
the legislature (or indeed the Silva court itself) meant when it required that in
order for section 95.11(4)(b) to apply, the diagnosis, treatment, or care be
rendered by a "provider of health care."2 93 We only know that one may not
look to the section 768.50(2)(b) definition in order to determine whether a
given defendant is a health care provider for statute of limitations purposes.
It is true, as Silva points out, that section 768.50(2)(b) had been repealed
and originally dealt with collateral sources, a topic not germane to the issues
294
of health care providers or the rendering of diagnosis, treatment, or care.
However, the Weinstock court noted that section 768.50(2)(b) had survived
to the extent that it supplied the definition of health care provider for
purposes of section 766.102(1), a section which sets forth the applicable
medical standard of care as it pertains to health care providers.295 Thus, the
Silva court's rejection of section 768.50(2)(b) as a source of the definition of
medical malpractice statute of
health care provider for purposes of the 296
Therefore, as Justice Grimes
limitations seems illogical and ill-conceived.
290. Id. at 1188-99.
291. Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1189.

292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.; see also Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993).
See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b); see also Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1188.
Silva,601 So. 2d at 1189.
Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835,836 (Fla. 1993) (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 766.102(1)

(1997), 768.50(2)(b) (1997)).
296. As pointed out in the preface to the official 1989 Florida Statutes: specific crossreferences to a statute are unaffected by later repeal of that statute. Prefaceto the FloridaStatutes,
(1997). See also Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1189 (Grimes, J., dissenting).

FLA. STAT.
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pointed out in his dissent in Silva, "[t]he fact that section 768.50 was
repealed in 1986 does not invalidate the reference to that statute because as
noted by the 1989 statutory reviser to section 766.102 'generally a specific
cross-reference is unaffected by subsequent amendments to or repeal of the
statute.' '297 This point is particularly compelling in light of the fact that no
section of the Act is as intimately involved with the subject of medical
malpractice claims against health care providers as section 766.102(1), which
in turn, expressly incorporates the section 768.50(2)(b) definition of that
term.
Since the supreme court has not modified, clarified, amplified, or
overruled Silva since it was decided in 1992, practitioners are left with very
little guidance in resolving the vital issue of whether their clients' claims are
against health care providers for purposes of whether section 95.11(4)(b)
applies to those claims. The best one can do is to look to other definitions of
health care provider set forth in various sections of chapter 766.298 However,
undeniably, those sections bear no more relevancy to this issue of who is a
health care provider for statute of limitations purposes than section
768.50(2)b2), which the Silva court noted deals with collateral sources of
indemnity. 9 In fact, the section 768.50(2)(b) definition is far more relevant
to the issue of the rendering of diagnosis, treatment, or care by health care
providers because its definition of health care provider is expressly
incorporated into section 766.102(1) which sets forth the medical standard of
care for health care providers and uses the term "health care provider(s)"
fully five times in one short paragraph. 300 The one thing that the Silva
decision does share in common with Weinstock is the view that statutes
restricting access to the courts (which a statute of limitations obviously
qualifies as) must be strictly construed so as not to deprive litigants of their
causes of action. 30 1 Aside from that commonality, however, the two
decisions are inconsistent and hopelessly irreconcilable at the present time.
In this writer's opinion, the time for change is now.

297. Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1190 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
299. Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1189.
300. See generallyFLA. STAT. § 766.102 (1997).
301. See Silva, 601 So. 2d at 1187. See also Baskerville Donovan Eng'rs, Inc. v.
Pensacola Executive House Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 581 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 1991). The
Baskerville court stated, "[w]here a statute of limitations shortens the existing period of time the
statute is generally construed strictly, and where there is reasonable doubt as to legislative intent,
the preference is to allow the longer period of time." Id. at 1303.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS: CLARITY, CONSISTENCY,
AND CONFORMITY

From the foregoing, it will come as no surprise that the law relating to
the applicability of presuit requirements and to the medical malpractice
statute of limitations needs to be reformed. The key elements for which the
Florida Legislature and/or courts should strive are clarity, consistency, and
conformity. The good news is that this can be achieved with a modicum of
thought and effort.
First, in the area of presuit, the legislature should clearly define exactly
what it means by the term "prospective defendants" in section 766.106(2) of
the Florida Statutes.0 2 If the term is intended to be synonymous with
"health care provider" as Weinstock suggests, 30 3 the legislature should clearly
state as much. Furthermore, the legislature could precisely define the term(s)
"prospective defendant' and/or "health care provider" in the body of section
766.102(2). The Florida Legislature did take the trouble to state under what
circumstances the claimant must notify, by certified mail, the Department of
Business and Professional Regulation of his intent to initiate litigation.
Therefore, there is no good reason why the legislature could not specifically
identify the precise individuals and/or entities who are entitled to presuit
notice under 766.106(2) in claims for medical malpractice. This would
obviate the need for courts to speculate or to jump from one subsection of
chapter 766 (none of which relate to presuit), to another in the vain hope of
determining who the legislature was referring to when it used the term
"prospective defendant" in section 766.106(2).
Second, the legislature and/or Supreme Court of Florida should clarify
the meaning of thephrase, "the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical
If that term is intended to mean instances where medical
care or services.
skill and judgment is required, the legislature should not only say so, but to
the extent possible, define what types of negligence fall within the sphere of
medical skill and judgment and what types do not, perhaps even setting forth
302. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2).
303. Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835,838 (Fla. 1993).
304. Section 766.106(2) of the Florida Statutes provides:
After completion of presuit pursuant to s. 766.203 and prior to filing a claim
for medical malpractice, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant
and, if any prospective defendant is a health care provider licensed under
chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, chapter 461, or chapter 466, the

Department of Business and Professional Regulation by certified mail, return
receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for malpractice.

Id.
305. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a).
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examples. The distinction between an obstetric patient who slips on amniotic
fluid while getting off a treatment table 3°6 versus a frail and elderly patient
who slips and falls in a hospital corridor due to a failure to provide a
wheelchair, handrails, or supervisory attendants 3°7 is tenuous at best. The
writer does not believe that the case law interpreting the term "the rendering
of, or the failure to render, medical care or services" 3°8 to mean instances
where the conduct in question fell below the standard of care set forth in
section 766.102309 is logical or practical. The threshold question here should
be, did the act or omission resulting in injury to the claimant constitute a
lapse in professional/medical skill and judgment or only a lapse in the
ordinary care any layman would be duty-bound to exercise in the same or
similar circumstances. Only then, for purposes of determining liability, not
coverage, does it make sense to inquire further whether the rendering or
failure to render medical care or services fell below what reasonably prudent
professionals would deem acceptable or appropriate in such a
circumstance. 10 The definition of "an action for medical malpractice" set
forth in section 95.11(4)(b) 311 is more precise and workable than the more
general definition of a "claim for medical malpractice" set forth in section
766.106(1)(a) 312 because it pinpoints the three specific areas out of which
culpability for medical malpractice can have its genesis (i.e. "diagnosis,"
"treatment," and "care").
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida has at least defined those
terms with a reasonable degree of precision, thereby facilitating their
application. 31 3 Why not synchronize the two definitions by making the
section 766.106(1)(a) definition identical to the definition set forth in section
95.1 1(4)(b)? This would go a long way toward fostering clarity, consistency,
and conformity in the statutory scheme.
Third, concerning the issue of what constitutes "an action for medical
malpractice" for purposes of section 95.11(4)(b), the scope of the language
"by any provider of health care" following the language "medical, dental or
is undefined and unclear. If a
surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care ... .
306. See Neilinger v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 460 So. 2d 564, 565 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding defendant's conduct gave rise to a claim for medical malpractice).
307. See Feifer v. Galen of Fla, Inc., 685 So. 2d 882, 838 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding defendant's conduct give rise to a claim sounding solely in ordinary negligence).
308. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)(a) (1997).
309. FLA. STAT. § 766.102.

310. Id.
311. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1997).
312. Id. § 766.106(1)(a).
313. Silva v. Florida Blood Bank, 601 So. 2d 1184, 1187 (Fla. 1992) (borrowing from the
medical definitions of "diagnosis" "treatment" and "care").
314. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b).
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non-health care provider, like the employee/technician in Lynn,3 15 is
negligent, then on one hand, it could be argued that neither the resultant suit
against the technician or against the hospital is "an action for medical
malpractice" within the meaning of section 95.11(4)(b) because the culpable
acts were not committed by a "health care provider," nor in that instance,
would either of the claims be against one who is vicariously liable for the
acts of a health care provider. On the other hand, it is axiomatic in tort law
that the acts of the employee or agent are deemed to be the acts of the
employer or principal respectively. 3 r6 Therefore, one could argue that the
claim against the hospital indeed arose out of medical treatment by a health
care provider, to wit, the hospital, because the culpable acts of the hospital's
employee in the rendering of treatment are tantamount to the acts of the
hospital. The potential confusion could be eliminated if 95.11(4)(b) were to
clearly state whether or not the acts and omissions of an employee non-health
care provider in rendering diagnosis, treatment, or care are deemed to be the
acts and omissions of the health care provider employer or principal for
purposes of section 95.11(4)(b).
Finally, it is the utter lack of any definition of the term "health care
provider" as it is used in section 95.11(4)(b) that is most troubling,
particularly in view of how Silva handled this issue and the conflicting
manner in which the court has defined the term "health care provider" for
purposes of section 766.106(2) and section 95.11(4)(b) respectively. In
Weinstock, the court expressly stated that for purposes of presuit, the term
"health care provider" means those individuals and entities listed as health
care providers under section 768.50(2)(b), 317 while in Silva the court
expressly rejected section 768.50(2)(b) as a source of the definition of health
care provider for purposes of 95.11(4)(b), the medical malpractice statute of
limitations.318
Not only does this seem arbitrary and inexplicably
inconsistent, but there remains a big gap in the fabric of section 95.11(4)(b),
because although the supreme court has told us which subsections cannot be
used to define the term "health care provider" for purposes of section
95.11(4)(b), 319 we are left clueless as to what that term means. This problem
could easily be solved if the legislature (preferably right in section
95.11(4)(b)) or the court, simply told us exactly who is a health care provider
for purposes of section 95.11(4)(b). Furthermore, there is no apparent reason
315. Lynn v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., Inc., 629 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.

1997).
316. See W. PAGE
499-501 (5th ed. 1984).

KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 69,

317. See Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 836 (Fla. 1993). See also supra text
accompanying note 108.
318. Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184, 1189 (Fla. 1992).
319. Id.
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why the definition of health care provider should be any different for
purposes of who is entitled to presuit notice under section 766.106(2) from
the definition of health care provider for purposes of section 95.11(4)(b).
Again, clarity, consistency, and conformity are the keys to a statutory scheme
which would be more comprehensible and easier to apply.
In the meantime, it is recommended that attorneys who have made a
determination regarding the status of their clients' claims file a lawsuit as
early on as possible. If, for example, an attorney concludes as best he or she
can that a given claim is for ordinary negligence, he should try to have at
least a bare-bones complaint on file well within the date the client discovered
or should have discovered the claim.320 That way, in the event the attorney's
assessment may have been wrong, this would, in all likelihood, be flushed
out by a responsive pleading seeking dismissal for failure to satisfy presuit
requirements. Then, even if the motion is granted, there will still be time to
prepare, serve, and file a notice of intent and accompanying corroborating
opinion. Indeed, as long as the two-year statute has not run, the plaintiff can
obtain an automatic extension in order to buy time and conduct the required
presuit investigation and also, as discussed earlier, enjoy the benefit of the
automatic ninety-day tolling period that engages upon service of the notice of
intent.
V. CONCLUSION

One can only hope that the Florida Legislature and/or the courts resolve
the vagarite and inconsistencies brought to light in this article. Until then,
practitioners must wander into that "labyrinth" of the Medical Malpractice
Reform Act and the medical malpractice statute of limitations and do their
best to avoid the "minotaurs" and "ugly treasons" lurking therein."' Badly
needed revision and clarification in the areas of coverage and the malpractice
statute of limitations by the legislature and/or the courts will result in a clear
and consistent set of rules and guidelines for practitioners and their clients to
rely upon and will greatly serve the ends of justice in the arena of medical
malpractice.

320. Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177, 181 (Fla. 1993).
321. See John A. Grant, Florida'sPresuitRequirementsfor Medical MalpracticeActions,
68 FLA. B.J. 12, 12 (Feb. 1994).
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